The Newsperson\u27s Privilege and the Right to Compulsory Process--Establishing an Equilibrium by Swierzbinski, Annett
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 49 Issue 5 Article 3 
1980 
The Newsperson's Privilege and the Right to Compulsory 
Process--Establishing an Equilibrium 
Annett Swierzbinski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Annett Swierzbinski, The Newsperson's Privilege and the Right to Compulsory Process--Establishing an 
Equilibrium, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 694 (1981). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol49/iss5/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
THE NEWSPERSON'S PRIVILEGE AND TIlE RIGHT TO COMPULSORY
PROCESS-ESTABLISHING AN EQUILIBRIUM
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has declined to recognize a first amendment privilege
for newspersons to protect the confidentiality of their sources. I One rationale
offered for this nonrecognition is the alleged conflict of such a privilege with a
criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to obtain compulsory process of
witnesses2 for his defense.3 The refusal to protect confidentiality, however,
necessarily restricts the press's newsgathering ability because informants,
reasonably fearing reprisals, are willing to disclose "information valuable to
the public discourse . . . only in confidence."4 These restrictions substantially
curtail the exercise of the press's first amendment rights' because newsgather-
ing and the corresponding need to guarantee anonymity to informants are
practical prerequisites to effective information dissemination.
The Supreme Court must protect both first and sixth amendment rights in
accordance with its role as the ultimate guardian of constitutional guaran-
tees.6 Characterization of a privilege of confidentiality as an infringement on
the right to compulsory process overlooks the possibility of providing equiva-
lent safeguards for both. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has viewed the full
exercise of these rights as conflicting. 7 This Comment suggests an approach
for resolving the alleged incompatibility of a newsperson's privilege of
confidentiality and the right to compulsory process. Protection of the rights of
the press and of the defendant should require discontinuance of a prosecution
when a defendant establishes that production of an anonymous source is
necessary for the adequate presentation of a defense.
Part I of this Comment establishes that the framers of the Constitution
intended to encompass newsgathering within the freedom of the press clause
and shows that the proper constitutional role of the press is to serve as an
unfettered investigative and informational agent of the public. Part II dis-
cusses recent judicial limitations imposed on the press and demonstrates the
need for a newsperson's privilege of confidentiality. Part III outlines the scope
of the proposed privilege and offers standards and limitations to prevent
abuse. The Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of these first and sixth
1. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory
process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
3. The Supreme Court has concluded that the first amendment interest of a newsperson in
maintaining the confidentiality of his sources is outweighed by the general obligation of all
citizens to give information when subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury or at trial. Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972).
4. Id. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
5. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ... of the press ... ." U.S. Const.
amend. I.
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803); see Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (implicitly overruled in Williawson v. Lee Optical
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955), and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-400
(1937)).
7. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
694
1980] FIRST AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 695
amendment rights, which has turned on the identity of the party asserting the
right, is analyzed in Part IV. Finally, Part V establishes the propriety of
discontinuing a prosecution when the defendant establishes a critical need for
the newsperson's privileged information.
I. THE MEANING OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS CLAUSE
A. Historical Underpinnings
Although no writing from the time of the proposal and adoption of the
Constitution expressly includes newsgathering within the concept of a free
press,8 both the context in which the press function emerged, and the general
purpose of the Bill of Rights9 indicate the framers' intent to proscribe
government interference with the press.10 In the early colonial period, press
freedom was initially interpreted as permitting only truthful criticism of
government."' When revolutionary controversy intensified in the mid-1700's,
8. A free press was thought necessary to secure popular control of government by keeping
citizens informed about governmental activities. The Federalist No. 84. at 576-77 (A. Hamilton)
(Ford ed. 1898); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (June 28, 1804), reprinted in L.
Levy, Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson 361-62 (1966). It is obvious that the press
cannot disseminate information that it is prohibited from acquiring. Newsgathering is a right so
intertwined with freedom of the press and so basic to the meaning of the free press clause that the
drafters did not specifically enumerate it. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 725-52 (1972), noted that newsgathering is a corollary to dissemination and gives
meaning to the right to publish. Id. at 727-28. "A popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both." 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court, however, has failed to reach a similar conclusion, a result possibly attributable to the
increasingly adversarial relationship of press and government. See pt. II infra.
9. According to Madison, the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution because "the great
mass of the people who opposed [the Constitution] disliked it because it did not contain effectual
provisions against encroachments on particular rights." I Annals of Cong. 450 (Gales & Seaton
eds. 1789). Congressman Goodhue said that it was intended to "secure in a stronger manner
[individual] liberties from the inroads of power." Id. at 443.
10. The prohibition against government restriction of the press in the Bill of Rights was
intended to encompass all branches of government. "The Bill of Rights changed the original
Constitution into a new charter under which no branch of government could abridge the people's
freedoms of press, speech, religion, and assembly." New York Times Co. v. United States. 403
U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has noted that the spirit of the
first amendment prevents the state from "contract[ing] the spectrum of available knowledge."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); see New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). References to -government" in this Comment
include the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Parts II-V deal specifically with the
judiciary and the press.
ii. L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression 64-67 (1960). In 1734, Peter Zenger published an
allegedly seditious article criticizing public officials. Zenger's defense attorney admitted his client's
responsibility, but asserted that truthful criticism of government warranted acquittal. I. Brant,
The Bill of Rights 176-77 (1965); L. Levy, supra note 8, at 43. Popular support of Zenger,
stemming partially from mounting dissatisfaction with colonial government, defeated the at-
tempts to punish him for his publication. I. Brant, supra, at 176-80. Zenger and his defense
attorney, Andrew Hamilton, became celebrated for their defense of unrestrained political
discussion. The effects of the Zenger trial were attributable to the developing concept among an
increasingly vocal part of the population that free persons possess a natural right to express their
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however, patriot leaders and the colonial press and public began defining
press freedom, upon discovery of its revolutionary power,12 in libertarian
terms.13 Unrestrained government criticism was extolled, even if libelous or
seditious. 14 Concurrently, this ability to incite political unrest led to more
vigorous, although increasingly unsuccessful, attempts by the British govern-
ment to curtail press freedom. 15 The adoption of the Bill of Rights, 6 rep-
thoughts without prior restraint or fear of subsequent reprisal. Id. at 179-80. Zenger had also
refused to reveal the identity of his sources despite government attempts to force disclosure.
Although the confidentiality of his sources was not an issue in the trial, the case may have
established the first precedent subsequently relied on in asserting a right to maintain the
anonymity of press informants against government attempts at compelling disclosure. M. Van
Gerpen, Privileged Communication and the Press 6 (1979). It is contrary to the American
Newspaper Guild's Code of Ethics for newspersons to disclose the identity of confidential
informants in courts or other judicial or investigative bodies. Beaver, The Newsman's Code, The
Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 Or. L. Rev. 243, 244 n.2 (1968); Guest
& Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 18, 29 n.54 (1969).
12. Although the right to criticize government had not previously been recognized, the
argument set forth in Zenger's case became the law. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964); L. Levy, supra note 8, at xxxii-xxxiii; L. Levy, supra note 11, at 258-60.
The case set a precedent of allowing journalists to expose practices of public officials to hold them
accountable to the public. M. Van Gerpen, supra note 11, at 6.
13. See L. Levy, supra note 11, at 64-69. The libertarian political viewpoint of colonial times
is reflected in a contemporary article stating that " '[plolitical liberty consists in a freedom of
speech and action, so far as the laws of a community will permit, and no farther: all beyond Is
criminal, and tends to the destruction of Liberty itself.-T!'hat Society whose laws least restrain
the words and actions of its members, is most free.' "Id. at 68-69 (quoting Boston Gazette, Mar.
9, 1767).
14. L. Levy, supra note 11, at 64-67.
15. See id. at 18-87. Newspapers in Britain had been subject to control from the time of King
Henry VIII, who had granted a monopoly to the "Stationer's Company" over the privilege of
printing and keeping presses. As an additional means of regulation, the Court of Star Chamber
had a general censorship power over the Company. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, Free
Press and Fair Trial'15-16 (1967). Publication of seditious libel against the government was a
capital offense, and no truth defense was available. Id. at 16. Two years after abolition of the
Star Chamber in 1641, Parliament assumed control of publication by passing Licensing Acts.
These Acts required licensing and registration before publication under penalty of forfeiture of the
presses for noncompliance. This practice was eliminated in 1695 when Parliament unsuccessfully
attempted to reenact the Licencing Acts. Id. at 16-17. Freedom of the press evolved to mean
freedom from prior or direct restraint. In 1715, Parliament devised a new method of controlling
the press through a stamp tax on newspapers and advertising. American colonists called these
levies " 'taxes on knowledge.' " Id. at 17. The purpose was to curtail the circulation of
newspapers, particularly cheaper ones that were generally read by the masses. Although the taxes
were ostensibly passed for the purpose of raising revenue, the actual motivation was to restrict
citizen acquisition of information concerning government affairs. Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 246 (1936). Restrictions on publication in England continued until 1869 when
the newspaper stamp tax was repealed, ending indirect restraints on press freedom. American
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, supra, at 18-19.
In 1768, the Boston Gazette printed an unsigned criticism of the colonial governor of Boston.
Chief Justice Hutchinson of the Massachusetts Bay Province persistently sought to have the
grand jury indict the author for criminal libel, which he analogized to treason. The grand jury,
on three separate occasions, refused to indict the author for seditious libel. L. Levy, supra note
11, at 69-70. By the 1770's, popular support for unrestrained criticism of colonial officials made It
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resented a recognition of the natural tendency of government to silence
impossible for the government to prosecute allegedly seditious statements. Id. at 72-73. In the
actual revolutionary period, the press was unfettered by the British colonial regime. Id. at 73-74.
Attempts to curtail press freedom continued in the early years of the Republic. Four years before
the first amendment was proposed, the Massachusetts legislature imposed a stamp tax on all
magazines and newspapers. This was followed in 1786 by a tax on advertisements. Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. at 248. The Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, passed
subsequent to the ratification of the Constitution, is indicative of the natural tendency of
government to act habitually to "destroy the rights of its citizens" by drawing power to a
centralized point. W. Berns, Freedom, Virtue & The First Amendment 68 (1957). The Act made
it a crime, punishable by five years in prison and a fine "if any person shall write, print, utter or
publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of
the United States, or either house of the Congress . . or the President . . with intent .. to
bring them ... into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them. . . the hatred of the good
people of the United States." Sedition Act of 1798, § 2, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, 596. Despite the
existence of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as a counterbalance to the strength of the
centralized federal system, the government persisted in attempting to stifle political criticism by
making publication of such information illegal. Although the attempt proved unsuccessful, the
Sedition Act exemplifies government efforts at continuing the pre-Constitution policy of curtailing
political freedom by silencing critics. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 204-05. The Sedition Act w-as
short-lived and led to the final repudiation of prosecutions for seditious libel. Fears that the
stifling of political criticism and control of public opinion would hinder informed citizen choice in
the election of 1800 prompted the adoption of a broad concept of free speech and press. L. Levy,
supra note 11, at 258-60. Prosecution under the Act had "a direct tendency to produce the very
state of things it sought to repress" and resulted in the "destruction of the party by which it was
adopted." 2 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 900 (8th ed. W. Carrington 1927); see The
Virginia Report of 1799-1800, reprinted in L. Levy, supra note 8, at 197. See also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276-77 (1964). The Sedition Act expired in 1801 and was
not reenacted. Id. The practice of curtailing the free flow of information concerning government
activities by means of "taxes on knowledge" was attempted as late as the 1930's. Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. at 244-45. Huey Long caused the levy of a 2% tax on the gross
advertising receipts of every newspaper with a circulation of 20,000 copies a week or more. This
tax affected 13 papers, 12 of which had opposed Long's hegemony in Louisiana politics. Senator
Long apparently had indicated that the tax would " 'help [the newspapers') lying some.'" H.
Nelson, Grosjean v. American Press Company, in Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the
Warren Court 347, 347 (H. Nelson ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Freedom of the Press). The
Supreme Court invalidated the tax, recognizing that it was designed to limit the circulation of
information to the public and not primarily for the financial support of the government. Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. at 250. The Court noted that the primary problem was not the
burden of paying the tax, but rather the resulting adverse consequences to the right of the people
to full information regarding the activities of the government. Id. The Court has reversed its
position by holding that press freedom and the detrimental effects accruing to the press from
government interference are issues considerably removed from that of the public's right to
information. See notes 109-14 infra and accompanying text.
16. A general feeling existed that explicit protection was required in the Constitution against
government restriction of popular rights. I. Brant, supra note 11, at 3; Black, The Bill of Rights,
35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865, 869 (1960). Alexander Hamilton felt that a bill of rights was superfluous
because the American Constitution was "professedly founded upon the power of the people, and
executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people
surrender nothing; and, as they retain everything, they have no need of particular reservations."
The Federalist No. 84, at S73 (A. Hamilton) (Ford ed. 1898). Nevertheless, the absence of a bill
of rights was an unyielding obstacle to ratification of the Constitution. See I B. Schwartz, The
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opponents. 1 7 The first amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press pro-
vided a means to truth ascertainment, a necessary prerequisite to the reasoned
decisionmaking inherent in a republican form of government.' 8
According to Alexander Hamilton,1 9 the importance of the press resulted
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 384, 443-44 (1971); Westen, The Compulsory Process
Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 96 (1974).
17. W. Berns, supra note 15, at 68. The Supreme Court recognized this tendency in NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), in which it held that the state could not
compel disclosure of the NAACP's membership lists because it was an impermissible attempt to
abridge the members' first amendment right to freedom of association. Id. at 461-63. The Court
stated that "[iut is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups
engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as [other]
forms of governmental action . . . particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." Id. at
462.
18. "The most effectual [means to truth] hitherto found, is the freedom of the press." Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (June 28, 1804), reprinted in L. Levy, supra note 8, at 362;
see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). In
this case, the United States sought to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers. The Court issued
six concurring and three dissenting opinions, after holding, per curiam, that the government had
not met the high burden required to uphold the imposition of a prior restraint on publication. Id.
at 714. Justice Black noted that "[t]he Government's power to censor the press was abolished so
that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so
that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrstrained
press can effectively expose deception in government." Id. at 717 (concurring opinion), In
concurring, Justice Douglas stated: "It should be noted at the outset that the First Amendment
provides that 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'
That leaves, in my view, no room for governmental restraint on the press." Id. at 720. Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion focused on the impermissibility of judicially imposed prior re-
straints on publication absent wartime conditions, a threat of nuclear holocaust, or other
circumstances posing a grave and immediate danger to national security. Id. at 724-27, Justices
Stewart, White, and Marshall viewed the matter as being within the Executive's province
because the Government argued that foreign affairs nd national defense were involved.
Therefore, it was the constitutional duty of the executive, not the judiciary, to preserve the
confidentiality necessary for effective national security and international relations. Id. at 727-48
(concurring opinions). Chief Justice Burger's dissent focused on the insufficiency of the record due
to the stay of the district court trial when the Court granted certiorari. He felt that the merits
should not have been reached. Id. at 751-52. Justice Harlan dissented, stating that the Court
should be more deferential to the Executive's conclusion that national security was threatened by
publication of the Pentagon Papers. Id. at 756-57. Justice Blackmum stated that the suit had
proceeded too quickly for a proper balancing of the press's right to print against the government's
right to prevent pulbication. Id. at 761-62 (dissenting opinion).
19. The Federalist No. 84, at 574 (A. Hamilton) (Ford ed. 1898). Alexander Hamilton
considered the Bill of Rights unnecessary because the Constitution enumerated powers granted to
the government, and the drafters of the Bill of Rights did not envision any power to restrain or
regulate the rights specifically granted therein. Hamilton feared that inclusion of tile Bill of
Rights, might raise a "plausible pretense" that the government had some regulatory power over
these basic freedoms. Id.; see I. Brant, supra note 11, at 3-15. He thought it patently absurd to
include a prohibition against the abuse of an authority that had not been given and feared that a
doctrine might arise acknowledging the existence of constructive government powers. Tle
Federalist No. 84, at 574 (A. Hamilton) (Ford ed. 1898). Conversely, it may be argued that the
adoption of the Bill of Rights precluded any argument that the government had constructive
regulatory power because of the absence of express prohibition. Both views, however, support tile
same conclusion-government interference with the free press was foreclosed.
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from its function as the "expeditious messengers of intelligence to the most
remote inhabitants of the Union,"20 to insure widespread involvement in our
representative form of government .2  Hamilton also emphasized the need for
the public to receive politically essential information from sources other than
the government to prevent undue control of public opinion.2 2 Hamilton's
statements, examined in conjunction with the ultimate inclusion of the Bill of
Rights in the Constitution, indicate that the drafters anticipated the existence
of an unfettered, adversarial press that gathers news and freely disseminates
information as an agent of the public 2 3 to ensure a true government by the
people. 24 Clearly, the press was intended to be an entity totally independent
20. The Federalist No. 84, at 577 (A. Hamilton) (Ford ed. 1898). He particularly emphasized
the importance of a free press in a society in which the citizens are geographically removed from
the central government. Id. Justice Douglas recognized the same function in his dissenting
opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 722 (1972).
21. The Federalist No. 84, at 576-77 (A. Hamilton) (Ford ed. 1898). Justice Brennan
reiterated Hamilton's view of the press's function when he stated that -[a) democracy depends
upon the existence of a public life and culture, and in a country of some 220 million, this would
scarcely be possible without the press." Brennan, The Symbiosis Between the Press and the
Court, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 15, col. I.
22. The Federalist No. 84, at 576-77 (A. Hamilton) (Ford ed. 1898).
23. M. Van Gerpen, supra note 11, at 5-6. The press's function is to investigate events,
expose harmful government practices, and inform the populace about the operations of bureauc-
racies, officials, and departments of government. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct 2898,
2914 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 856 (1974)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
24. The system of checks and balances provided another protection against the centralization
of power. Concern for the preservation of state powers indicates the framers' fear that democracy
could be jeopardized if freely functioning, independent sources of information did not exist. The
Federalist No. 59, at 395-96 (A. Hamilton) (Ford ed. 1898). The Federalist further supports the
characterization of the press as an agent of the public when functioning as newsgatherer.
Opponents of the federal system argued that it was improper to confer expansive powers on a
national government that would be too remote from many states to allow the constituents to
obtain adequate knowledge of the conduct of the representative bodies. Id. No. 84, at 576-77 (A.
Hamilton) (Ford ed. 1898). In response, Hamilton stated that a responsible government depended
more on the facility of communication than on citizen proximity. Id. He cited the existence of
three agents of the remote citizenry who would watch over the actions of the federal
government-the executive and legislative bodies of each state, those citizens in close proximity to
the seat of federal government, and the press. Id. In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843 (1974), Justice Powell agreed that the role of the press "[i]n seeking out the news," is that of
"an agent of the public at large." Id. at 863 (dissenting opinion). He rearticulated this position in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2914 (1979) (concurring opinion). See also Nixon v.
Warner Communs., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665. 722
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). This intended status is incompatible with that of a government
tool, a role that could result when dissemination is protected but newsgathering is substantially
controlled and chilled. Moreover, the agent of the public function assumes greater importance as
government becomes progressively more complex. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697 (1931). In Near, the Court stated that "the administration of government has become more
complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has grown to
most serious proportions, and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and of the
impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and official
neglect, emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great
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of the government.2 It is unlikely that the framers intended the contradiction
that "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press, which
freedom, however, is to be regulated by law."'26 The Supreme Court also
recognized the press's function as agent of the public when it stated that "[a]
responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field .... The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to exten-
sive public scrutiny and criticism." '27
cities." Id. at 719-20. The newsgathering aspect, of which the privilege of confidentiality is an
essential element, is more crucial today than it was in the 1700's. Brennan, supra note 21, at 15.
In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (19451, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the first amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, [and] that a
free press is a condition of a free society." Id. at 20. The legislative branch has similarly
recognized the importance of public access to government controlled information as antecedent
to the exercise of other constitutional rights. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1976). In enacting this statute, Congress's basic premise was that the people "in the words of
Federalist No. 49 . . . 'are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the
constitutional charter ... is derived.' Government is and should be the servant of the people, and
it should be fully accountable to them for the actions which it supposedly takes on their behalf. In
a theoretical sense, the agencies in the executive branch are already accountable to the people
through the President. . .and the Congress .... This theoretical accountability, though, leaves
agency commissioners far removed from the public view in their day-to-day activities. Absent
special circumstances, there is no reason why the public should not have the right to observe tile
agency decisionmaking process first-hand." H.R. Rep. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted
in [19761 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2183, 2184. See also Note, The Right of the Press to
Gather Information, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 838 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Right of the Press]. Justice
Stewart expressed concern that requiring newspersons to testify in grand jury proceedings
concerning information received from confidential sources would be an invitation to the govern-
ment "to try to annex the press as an investigative arm." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 744
n.34 (1972) (dissenting opinion). Government use of the press in such a manner severely impinges
on first amendment freedoms. Id. at 744. The Justice Department established guidelines for press
subpoenas, stating that "[tlhe Department of Justice does not consider the press 'an investigative
arm of the government.' " Id. at 707 n.41. Annexation of the press as an investigative branch of
government would leave the public with only official versions of crucial events. Newsmen's
Privilege: Hearings on S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S. 750, S. 870, S. 917, S. 1128 and
S.J. Res. 8 Before the Subcomm. on Const'l Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (statement of the Citizen's Right to
News Committee); see Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 497-516 (1941). Justice
Douglas has recognized that "[s]ecrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, per-
petuating bureaucratic errors." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971)
(concurring opinion). Most confidential sources problems have arisen in connection with such
issues as the Pentagon Papers, the My Lai massacre, thalidomide, Watergate, the ITT scandal,
and illegal CIA activities-matters in which government self-interest is best served by nondisclo-
sure. Hearings, supra, at 553; see Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case
for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 160, 174 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Federal
Shield Law].
25. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
26. G. Hay, An Essay on the Liberty of the Press, 1799, reprinted in L. Levy, supra note 8,
at 190.
27. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
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B. The Proper Role of Press Freedom in the Constitutional Framework
By characterizing infringements on a free press as a method of safeguarding
other constitutional rights,28 the Supreme Court has inverted the framers'
intent that the press act as a guardian against the abridgment of constitutional
rights by government abuse of its powers. 29 Diminution in public support of
the press has enabled the Court to sanction infringements on press freedom.
30
By utilizing press abuses to rationalize curtailment, the Court purports to be
protecting the individual from the press. 31 Although the press occasionally
oversteps its function, 32 governmental curtailment of press freedom is unjus-
tified. The framers recognized the potential for abuse and declined to provide
for government restrictions to curb such abuse.
33
Although the free press clause protects against government restraint,34 even
a literal and absolutist reading of the first amendment 35 recognizes that press
28. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 2701, 2704 (1979) (press liable for
defamation of convict despite lack of "actual malice"); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697
(1972) (private system of press informants would pose threat to citizen's expectations of privacy).
29. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Steu'-art, J.,
concurring); id. at 714 (Black, J., concurring); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931). The government, by enforcement of statutory and common law,
prevents private infringement of rights and provides remedies when such infringement occurs.
For example, a subsequent damage remedy is available when defamation or invasion of privacy
has occurred. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979), is indicative of the Court's
view that restraint on the free press preserves individual rights. In llolston, the Court held that
the press was liable for defamation of a convict, despite the absence of proof of actual malice as
required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Surprisingly, the
constitutional guarantee of a free press was given lesser importance than an individual's
reputational interest that the Supreme Court previously held to be neither a liberty nor a property
interest worthy of constitutional protection. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976). One
rationale for the Paul decision is that the individual was claiming a reputational injury by the
state rather than by the press. Id. at 695-97. Constitutional rights, however, are to be protected
by the government from government infringement. See notes 9-10 supra.
30. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 548-51 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-48 (1974); Brennan, supra note 21, at 15, 31. But see Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931).
31. See 1947 Commission on Freedom of the Press, The Problem and the Principles of
Freedom and Responsibility, in Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 387. The Commission
concluded that unless the media improved its performance and acted more responsibly, govern-
ment would undertake measures of control and regulation that the public would not oppose. See
id. at 388-92 (quoting the Commission's findings). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 271 (1964); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931); M. Van
Gerpen, supra note 11, at 181.
32. See notes 50-61 infra, and accompanying text.
33. James Madison stated that "[slome degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
everything; and in no instance is ihis more true than in that of the press." 4 Elliot's Debates on
the Federal Constitution 571 (1876).
34. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716-19 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring); Brant, The Madison Heritage, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 882, 898-99 (1960); Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 252.
35. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 714-20 (Black, J., concurring); Meiklejohn, supra note 34.
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freedom is not limitless in scope. Natural limitations exist due to the presence
of other rights36 that may delineate the extent to which any freedom is
enjoyed. The government, however, may not establish its own parameters for
the people's exercise of constitutional guarantees.
3 7
Despite the existence of these natural limitations, constitutional rights are
not inherently inimical. 38 A clash may arise, however, from overstepping the
natural limits of constitutional freedoms. For example, a "media trial" of a
defendant in which information tending to prejudice him is dramatized, with
unnecessary emphasis on unnewsworthy aspects of the prosecutorial investi-
gation and the defendant's personal life, would constitute an abuse of first
amendment rights. Information of this kind provides the public with little
insight into matters relevant to political operations. Rather, it merely satisfies
the public's thirst for the sensational. When the sensational aspect infringes on
the right to a fair trial, the newsperson is not functioning within the protected
constitutional role of the press.
39
In analyzing the extent of the first amendment's protection of the press, a
central issue involves determining when the press acts in its constitutionally
conceived capacity so as to be free from government control and afforded
government safeguards. Two functions emerge from examining the historical
development of the free press concept-investigation and dissemination.
Investigation by the press should be unrestrained to allow exposure of
government misfeasance 40 and to provide the means for voters to "acquire the
36. Brant, supra note 34, at 899; notes 215-16 infra and accompanying text.
37. See Black, supra note 16, at 866-67, 874-76. History indicates that the first amendment
prohibition against abridging press freedom should be strictly applied against the government. Id.
The government's proper role is to coordinate and protect the people's free exercise of constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights, rather than to inhibit, restrain, or control. Such actions will be struck
down as long as the Supreme Court "know(s] how to read the language of liberty." 1. Brant,
supra note 11, at 8. When governmental curtailment of rights has occurred, it has ostensibly
transpired within the context of protecting other rights. For example, prior restraints on
publication may be imposed when there is a grave threat to national security, Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931), or when disclosure of information will result in "direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). The government cannot properly assert
that it is the sole protector of societal interests, however, after having first determined what the
protectable interests should be, as well as determining their relative importance. The danger is
too great that the interests of the people could rapidly be sublimated to government self-interest.
38. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Supreme Court, in
invalidating a ban on dissemination of news concerning a criminal trial, noted the infrequency of
clashes between first amendment rights and sixth amendment guarantees of a fair trial. Id. at
554. The Court stated that "tensions develop between the right of the accused to trial by an
impartial jury and the rights guaranteed others by the First Amendment" when the press
sensationalizes the events of the case. Id. at 551. In such instances, the news media oversteps its
zone of constitutional protection by impermissibly intruding on the rights of other individuals.
See notes 56-61 infra and accompanying text. Although the Court's holding in Nebraska Press Is
favorable to the press, this may be attributable to the Nebraska courts' imposition of a prior
restraint. Id. at 563-65. Courts have traditionally disfavored direct government restraints on
publication. See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 4273 (Mar. 18, 1980);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
39. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
40. See Meiklejohn, supra note 34, at 259; note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general wel-
fare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express."'4' Additionally,
press circulation and dissemination of information must not permissibly be
infringed on by government action. Circulation ensures the operation of other
constitutional guarantees by keeping the public aware of government ac-
tivities. In this respect, the press performs a function analogous to the system
of checks and balances within the federal government and within the state-
federal government structure. 4
2
Newsgathering, as a prerequisite to the effective performance of the press's
functions, should be afforded a high degree of first amendment protection
under the free press clause. 43 Refusal to protect the information gathering
process requisite to dissemination would result in the total evisceration of the
press's operation. In Branzburg v. Hayes," the Supreme Court recognized the
irrationality of safeguarding freedom of the press without corresponding
protection of newsgathering. 45 The Court minimized the protection of news-
gathering, however, by stating that the right to gather news is protected only
when it involves information to which the general public has access.46
The sixth amendment further delineates and clarifies the press's boundaries
of protected operation. A criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial,
including the right to the compulsory process of witnesses favorable to his
defense.47 The government is charged with securing this right 48 as part of its
role of safeguarding constitutional rights from government infringement.4 9
41. Meiklejohn, supra note 34, at 255. See also 2 T. Cooley, supra note 15, at 886.
42. In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), the Court stated: "The
newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is safe to say, have shed and
continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other
instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints
upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press
cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern." Id. at 250.
43. "A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news. . . No less
important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of information. News must not be
unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to publish
would be impermissibly compromised." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727-28 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
44. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
45. Id. at 707-08.
46. Id. at 684. This ignores the press's "watchdog" role that forces government to remain
responsive to the people. Furthermore, the Court held that although the press was free to gather
news from any source and by any means within the law, any court could compel dislosure of
sources- Id. at 708. Thus, the protection recognized by the Court was effectively removed by
stating that the government has an equal right to acquire the information discovered by members
of the press, thereby annexing the press as an arm of government. The Court recognized
protection of newsgathering only insofar as such protection did not run afoul of the government's
interests. Id. at 690-91.
47. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the Court held that the sixth amendment
right of an accused is a fundamental element of due process. Id. at 17-19. Compelling testimony
of witnesses is coexistent with the right of a defendant to present a defense and equal in
importance to the right to confront adverse witnesses. Id.
48. See id. at 22-23.
49. See note 29 supra.
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Conflict allegedly arises when government action or inaction causes denigra-
tion of a defendant's rights. Such government inaction occurred in Sheppard
v. Maxwell,"° in which a trial judge, by failing to curb press behavior,
permitted a criminal proceeding to take place in a "carnival atmosphere," 5'
and failed to insulate the jury properly from prejudicial publicity.5 2 The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the judge insufficiently pro-
tected the defendant's rights.5 3 Although the public has the right to informa-
tion concerning judicial proceedings,5 4 Sheppard recognized that sen-
sationalism is of no value to democracy.55 Therefore, action by the trial judge
to guarantee the defendant's rights would not have conflicted with the first
amendment because the press had functioned irresponsibly. The press spec-
tacularized the courtroom proceedings5 6 rather than fulfilling its constitutional
function by gathering and disseminating newsworthy information without
injury to the defendant."7
50. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
5 I. Id. at 358. The trial judge allowed the press to virtually control the courtroom during the
trial and to harass the participants. A press table was set up near the jury box and counsel table.
The movement in and out of the courtroom of the large number of reporters covering the trial
caused confusion and disruption of the proceedings. Additionally, jurors were insufficiently
insulated from the publicity given the proceedings. This, combined with the prejudicial and
sensationalized attention given to the murder in the pre-trial phase, led the Court to conclude that
the defendant had been deprived of his sixth amendment rights. Id. at 354-55.
52. Id. at 358-62.
53. Id. at 363.
54. Id. at 350. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
55. The framers sought to protect the free press because of its value to democracy. See notes
8-15 supra and accompanying text.
56. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1966).
57. This tendency to sensationalize is attributable to the press's status as a moneymaking
venture, aside from its role as a tool of democracy. Judicial claims that a press privilege would
unnecessarily favor business enterprises should not undercut constitutional arguments. The
moneymaking aspect of the news media increases the flow of information to the public. Guest &
Stanzler, supra note 11, at 41-43. See also Beaver, supra note 11, at 249. The Supreme Court has
used the business aspect of the press to deny constitutional protection. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 576 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (absent constitutional role, press deserves no
greater protection from government than doctor or bank). When the news media have claimed
that the first amendment exempts the press from business regulation, however, the Court has
found that the Constitution does not protect the capitalistic aspect of the press. See, e.g.,
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (press must comply with the National Labor
Relations Act because it is engaged in interstate commerce); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229
U.S. 288 (1913) (requirements that newspapers supply information concerning their internal
structure to the Post Office Department and that paid for matter be marked advertisement as a
prerequisite to use of the mails does not violate the first amendment). In Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), the Court held that the first amendment protects liberty of
thought and expression but does not serve as "a shield for business publishers who engage in
business practices condemned by the Sherman Act." Id. at 7. The Court stated that first
amendment interests were actually protected by prohibitions against news media monopolies
because such restraints fostered the flow of informataon to the public from "diverse and
antagonistic sources." Id. at 20; see Citizen Publishing Co v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40
(1969) (application of antitrust laws to the press does not violate the first amendment); Lorain
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In re Farber58 provides another example of the press overstepping the
natural scope of first amendment protection and infringing on other rights.
Myron Farber, a New York Times reporter, investigated alleged murders
committed by Dr. Mario Jascalevich5 9 and instigated his prosecution. The
court noted that the newsperson had acted as an arm of the prosecution and,
therefore, protection did not adhere under the New Jersey shield law. 60 A
consensus exists among newspersons and the courts that the press was not
intended to be an agent of the criminal justice system while retaining its first
amendment protections. 61 The judiciary, however, has not confined lim-
itations on the press to instances in which the press acts beyond its protected
scope. The restrictions imposed strike at the heart of the press's first amend-
ment rights.
H. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON AND HOSTILITY TOWARD THE PRESS
Although freedom of the press, like other freedoms, has natural limita-
tions, 6 2 the proper constitutional boundaries differ sharply from judicially im-
posed strictures. The cumulative effect of the restrictions emerging from
recent Supreme Court decisions 63 is a substantial curtailment of the free flow
of information to the public. The adversarial relationship between the gov-
ernment and the press has led to only partial recognition of constitutional
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155-56 (1951) (same). See also FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (agency rules prohibiting cross-ownership
by newspapers of broadcast media do not violate first amendment).
58. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
59. Dr. Mario Jascalevich was charged with murdering five hospitalized patients by lethal
injections of curare in 1965 and 1966. At that time, these deaths, along with eight others, were
attributed to natural causes. Years later, Myron Farber conducted a lengthy investigation that
culminated in the publication of a number of articles in the New York Times raising the question
of whether the deaths were actually homicides. Dr. Jascalevich had been experimenting with
curare, a powerful muscle relaxant drug, at the time of the deaths. Farber's investigation led the
prosecutor to seek a grand jury indictment, although Dr. Jascalevich was eventually acquitted.
State v. Jascalevich, 158 N.J. Super. 488, 386 A.2d 466 (Super. Ct. Law Div.), aff'd sub nor. In
re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
60. In re Farber, 78 N.J. at 277, 394, A.2d at 339. The New Jersey shield law extends a
broad confidentiality privilege to a newsperson engaged "in the course of pursuing his professional
activities," meaning "any situation, including a social gathering, in which a reporter obtains
information for the purpose of disseminating it to the public." N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:84A-21 to
-21a (Vest 1976 & Supp. 1977). Farber clearly had a strong pecuniary interest in the defendant's
conviction because he was writing a book based on the trial. Members of the news media who
supported his refusal to identify the confidential sources withdrew their support when they
learned he was writing a book, the success of which depended largely on a conviction of Dr.
Jascalevich. A newspersoi's investigation undertaken for financial gain at the defendant's expense
constitutes an abuse of first amendment protections. Mowlana & Logue, Fair Trial vs. a Free
Press: A New Phase in an Old Conflict, USA Today, Jan., 1979, 28, 31.
61. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 553; Mowlana & Logue, supra note 60, at 30-31.
62. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
63. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1980, § A, at 16, col. 1 (fear of adverse judicial precedent
caused ABC news to surrender tapes subpoened by grand jury); notes 83-88 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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rights by the Court.14 For example, the Court has refused to acknowledge the
importance of anonymity to investigative newsgathering. 65 This unwillingness
is partially attributable to the political circumstances out of which press
subpoenas arose. 
66
A. Origins of the Recent Conflict
The use of press subpoenas became a "hot issue" when the press was
informing the public on topics relevant to popular political decisionmaking, 67
and when the government status quo was threatened by public knowledge of
corrupt or inept practices and policies. 68 In the late 1960's and early 1970's,
the emphasis on "law and order" increased the investigative curiosity of the
64. Justice Douglas recognized that "[t]he Court has not always been consistent in Its
protection of . . . First Amendment rights and has sometimes allowed a government interest to
override the absolutes of the First Amendment." Branzburg v, Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 716 (1972)
(dissenting opinion).
65. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-95 (1972). But see Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60 (1960). In Talley, the Court struck down a city ordinance forbidding public distribution of any
handbill not bearing the name and address of the author. The Court noted the importance of
anonymity to first amendment freedoms: "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even
books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects
from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws
either anonymously or not at all. . . . Even the Federalist Papers . . . were published under
fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive
purposes." Id. at 64-65. In Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court held
unconstitutional a municipal ordinance requiring any person desiring to canvass or solicit from
house to house for charitable causes or for political campaigns or causes to give advance written
notice to the local police department for purposes of identification. Justice Brennan, In a
concurring opinion, stated that "apprehension of reprisal by the average citizen is too often well
founded. The national scene in recent times has regrettably provided many instances of penalties
for controversial expression in the form of vindictive harassment, discriminatory law enforce-
ment, executive abuse of administrative powers, and intensive government surveillance," Id. at
626 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, policymaking government officials often use anonymity to
advance or criticize a government program by speaking to newspersons "off the record." M. Van
Gerpen, supra note 11, at 93.
66. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (press investigations concerning the drug culture
and Black Panther party); Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1978) (Watergate
investigation); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (break-in
at the offices of the Committee); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup.
Ct. 1977) (confidential information concerning official improprieties).
67. For example, reporters involved in the investigation of the Watergate break-in were
subpoenaed by the Committee to Re-elect the President. Although the district court refused to
recognize an absolute newsperson's privilege because of the Supreme Court's decision in
Branzburg, it quashed the subpoenas because the Committee had failed to demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in the information sought. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v.
McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
68. In Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977), a reporter
who received information from an informant about purported official improprieties on the express
condition that the source's identity be kept confidential was held to possess no privilege of
confidentiality under the Constitution or the New York shield law, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law
§ 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1979), despite the public interest in exposing official misfeasance.
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press. 6 9 Hostility between the government and the press intensified 70 as press
privilege was increasingly viewed as an obstacle to the law and order
sentiment.71 For example, the press had access to dissident groups that were
totally dosed to government infiltration. 72 Press subpoenas were the only way
for the government to acquire information about these groups' activities. 73 To
subdue the conflicts that arose from a strong assertion of individual rights of
free expression by citizens discontented with government policies and deter-
mined to effect change, the government attempted to restrict the press in a
struggle over the acquisition and dissemination of information. 71
The areas of news that are almost exclusively dependent on confidentiality
include coverage of minority, radical, and fringe groups7s and the exposition
of government corruption, waste, secrecy, and distortion. 76 Disclosure enables
government infiltration of these groups by employing the press as an inves-
tigative arm of the government.77 Infiltration through forced disclosure raises
69. See Federal Shield Law, supra note 24, at 162-64. The 1969 trial of the "Chicago Seven"
was the first sign of the growing use of press subpoenas. The government subpoenaed four major
Chicago newspapers and three television networks for their notes, film footage, rough drafts,
stories, and other materials connected with the Democratic convention. United States v.
Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
70. The frequency of press subpoenas increased during the Nixon administration. In its first
30 months, 30 subpoenas were served on the Chicago Sun Times and the Chicago Daily News,
two-thirds of which were on the government's behalf. Hearings, supra note 24, at 542 (statement
of Rep. Abzug). One reporter was served in 11 separate proceedings within a year and one half.
Id. During the same two and one half years, NBC and CBS were subpoenaed 124 times by
federal and state prosecutors, as well as by defendants. Id.
71. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971), concerned stories about the synthesis of
hashish from marijuana in a comprehensive survey of drug use. Branzburg wrote two articles
based on interviews with and observations of local drug users. He was subpoenaed by a grand
jury and asked to identify the parties he had observed. Branzburg claimed a first amendment
newsperson's privilege to keep his sources confidential. The Kentucky court rejeced his claim.
Id. at 348. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), involved press access to a Black
Panther news conference at Panther headquarters during a time of civil disorder. Pappas had
promised not to reveal what he had observed in Panther headquarters. He was subpoenaed by a
grand jury and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to quash the summons. Id. at
614-15, 266 N.E.2d at 303-04. In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal.), reLd and
remanded, 434 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970), arose from subpoenas issued to a New York Times
reporter assigned to cover the Black Panther Party and other militant groups. Caldwell was
ordered to appear before the grand jury with notes and recordings of interviews with officers of
the Black Panther Party concerning the aims, purposes, and activities of the organization. The
district court held that CaldweU was required to respond to the subpoenas but need not reveal
confidential associations until the government demonstrated a "compelling and overriding na-
tional interest that cannot be served by alternative means." Id. at 360. The three cases were
joined in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Supreme Court refused to recognize a
press privilege to maintain the anonymity of sources and held that the newspersons could be
compelled to testify before the grand jury. Id. at 709.
72. See note 71 supra.
73. See M. Van Gerpen, supra note 11, at 29-57.
74. Hearings, supra note 24, at 560 (statement of Dick Fogel); id. at 361 (statement of Paul
Branzburg).
75. See note 71 supra.
76. See notes 67-68 supra.
77. Hearings, supra note 24, at 553 (statement of the Citizen's Right to News Committee).
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fears of reprisal by politically and socially dissatisfied groups and destroys
press access to those groups. 78 This, in turn, causes an effective silencing of
government opponents by depriving them of a public forum, as well as the
destruction of the press's ability to check government through publicizing
dissident viewpoints. 79 The government is able to halt investigations into
official corruption and misfeasance by silencing subordinates who might have
come forward if newspersons could have assured confidentiality.8 0 Forced
disclosure also aids the cover-up of police and prosecutorial abuses or un-
known areas of crime that threaten the populace.' The government can
therefore silence dissent and disagreement concerning government policies
within both the bureaucratic structure and dissident groups nationwide.8 2
The ramifications of government policy toward the press are not imaginary.
In 1973, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted hearings on a proposed
newsperson's privilege.8 3 A substantial number of reporters filed affidavits to
support allegations that attempts to force disclosure of confidential sources
have inhibited press freedom. 84 Inhibition of the free flow of information to
the public has resulted from (1) stories cancelled because an absolute promise
of confidentiality could not be offered;85 (2) stories unpublished;8 6 and (3)
78. See id. See also note 65 supra.
79. Without confidential informants, the public would not have learned about the Bobby
Baker scandal, the Pentagon Papers, the ITT scandal, thalidomide, the My Lai massacre, or tile
Watergate cover-up, unless the government decided to release an official version of these events.
Hearings, supra note 24, at 553 (statement of the Citizen's Right to News Committee).
80. Id. at 552-54. The Supreme Court recognized that police informants will not come
forward without a promise of anonymity. The Court found that the purpose of the police
informants privilege is to encourage citizens to come to law enforcement officials with information
to promote effective law enforcement. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698 (1972). The Court
has refused, however, to recognize the public's need for information concerning government
activities and politically significant matters that is fulfilled by a press privilege of confidentiality.
See note 109 infra. The Court apparently wants information to flow freely from the citizens to tile
government, but wants to restrict the flow of information about the government to tile citizens.
Justice Stewart disagreed with the Court's position. He felt that a right of confidentiality between
a newsperson and his informant implicitly follows from recognition of a right to newsgather.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 728 (dissenting opinion). His conclusion was based on
recognition of three factual predicates: "(1) newsmen require informants to gather news; (2)
confidentiality . . . is essential to the creation and maintenance of a news-gathering relationship
with informants; and (3) an unbridled subpoena power . . . will either deter sources from
divulging information or deter reporters from gathering and publishing information." Id.
81. Hearings, supra note 24, at 553. Additionally, deterrence of press informants by denial of
the privilege hinders detection of crime. Without press sources, no one, including law enforce-
ment officials, would ever have learned that certain crimes had occurred. Federal Shield Law,
supra note 24, at 165.
82. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 553 (statement of the Citizen's Right to News Committee).
83. Id. Eight bills were offered to create a newsperson's testimonial privilege. Id. at 407-62.
84. Id. at 752-58.
85. CBS news was forced to cancel an interview with a woman who offered to disclose how
she cheated on welfare because it could not promise her confidentiality, Id. at 755. ABC news
declined to film interviews with Black Panthers in their headquarters because a promise of
confidentiality could not be given. Id. The Boston Globe terminated an investigation of official
corruption because sources told the newspersons they were afraid of having their identities
revealed. Id.
1980] FIRST AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 709
stories not begun.8 7 Evidence before the Judiciary Committee also cited
instances of press harassment by government officials when the reporter
sought "to be something other than a cheerleader for [the] government. "18
B. The Supreme Court's Position
Once it is established that the government has abridged the press's con-
stitutional rights, the ultimate issue is whether a subsequent remedy is
adequate and, as a practical matter, effective. 8 9 The Supreme Court main-
tains that the burden on the press of compelled disclosure is insubstantial and
speculative, and that no evidence exists to support claims of a chilling effect
on the press.90 Analysis of the entire trend of Supreme Court restrictions on
the press, however, reveals that government power is increasingly intensified
in proportion to the degree that the press is harnessed. 9 ' Furthermore, the
86. Publication is frequently foregone because of the fear of incurring crippling legal fees in
resisting subpoenas. M. Van Gerpen, supra note 11, at 98.
87. Although it is impossible to determine precisely how many sources would have come
forward with important information if assured of anonymity, many reporters feel that a
significant number are being deterred. A.M. Rosenthal, New York Times Executive Editor,
noted that "[ylou always know when the phone rings, but you never know when it might have
rung and was silent." M. Van Gerpen, supra note 11, at 97 (footnote omitted).
88. Hearings, supra note 24, at 559 (statement of William Eginton).
89. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), note 91 infra,
90. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682, 693 (1972). In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978), the Court rejected contentions that confidential sources will disappear and
the press will suppress news if searches of newsrooms are allowed. The Court characterized the
effect of search warrants as "incremental." Id. at 566. Justice Stewart expressed concern about
the effects the Court's holding would have on the press's ability to fulfill its constitutionally
designated function of informing the public. He found the Court's position that sources will not
disappear to be illogical, because a person who gives information only on the condition that his
identity will not be revealed will naturally be less likely to give that information if he knows his
identity may in fact be revealed. Id. at 572 (dissenting opinion).
91. The result in United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979),
exemplifies the strengthening of the government's power to curtail the free press. A federal district
court judge issued a preliminary injunction restraining publication of a magazine article showing
how to construct a hydrogen bomb. Courts had previously viewed prior restraints as virtually
impermissible because they infringed so greatly on first amendment liberties. New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). A prior restraint was justifiable only when a grave threat to national
security existed and a showing of direct and irreparable harm could be made. Such criteria are
more easily shown during times of war. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The
alleged harm resulting from publication of the Progressive article was speculative and uncertain.
The court stated that the article might allow a medium-sized nation "to move faster in developing
a hydrogen weapon. It could provide a ticket to by-pass blind alleys." 467 F. Supp. at 993. This
justification is seriously weakened by the existence of a published thesis by a Princeton University
physics student demonstrating how to make your own plutonium bomb. The student stated that
his aim was to show " 'that any undergraduate with a physics background can [design and build
an atomic bomb], and therefore that it is reasonable to assume that terrorists could do it, too' "
N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1976, at 16, col. 5. The Progressive court balanced free press interests
against government contentions of threats arising from publication. The government interest
won, although, according to the defendant, the interest was the suppression of information
concerning weaknesses in its security system. 467 F. Supp. at 994. The relevance of this
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Court has seemingly ignored empirical information concerning actual lim-
itations on the free flow of information. 92
In Branzburg v. Hayes,93 the Court held that no first amendment privilege
attaches to newspersons desiring to maintain the confidentiality of their
sources, 94 thereby allowing the government to subpoena reporters and compel
disclosure. 95 The Court subordinated the public interest in obtaining infor-
mation through the use of anonymous informants to the interests of law
enforcement officials in uncovering the sources of information. 96 This result
overlooks the ramifications of government access to confidential press
sources. 97 Although Branzburg dealt specifically with grand jury subpoenas, 91
it has been interpreted by several lower courts as precluding any constitu-
tional press privilege. 9 9
The Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily'0 0 further restricts press
independence and curtails the flow of information to the public. The Court
sanctioned searches of newspaper offices for evidence of crime reasonably
believed to be on the premises. 0 1 This decision chills press freedom because
usually, the evidence of crime sought is material acquired through anonymous
sources. 10 2 Additionally, unannounced police searches of newsrooms provide
a means for the government to discover confidential information and the
identities of press sources totally unrelated to the crime for which evidence is
sought.
In Zurcher, the Court rejected, as it did in Branzburg,103 the argument
information to the public exists in the public's right to full information to aid decisionmaking on
future policy. Information revealing the ineffectiveness of government efforts at secrecy In
relation to nuclear weapons is clearly relevant. Previously, the government attempted to use prior
restraints to conceal embarassing information. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 723-24 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). In that case, the Court declined to enjoin publication
of the Pentagon Papers. Id. at 714 (per curiam). Presently, the Progressive case illustrates the
effect of the Court's increasing activism in infringing on press freedom. The district court felt that
destruction of a free press is a reparable harm. 467 F. Supp. at 996. The unaddressed rhetorical
question is, however, who will restore the press once it is destroyed: the government that has
acted to wrest this power from the public?
92. See notes 85-87 supra; cf. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 57-61 (survey of editors of
daily newspapers nationwide). See also Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional
Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 Yale L.J. 317, 330-32 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Reporters and Their Sources].
93. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
94. Id. at 690.
95. Id. at 690-91.
96. Id. at 686-88, 690, 695.
97. Id. at 735-36, 744 n.34 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 682.
99. United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 213-15 (D.D.C. 1972); In re Farber, 78 N.J.
259, 268, 394 A.2d 330, 334, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); People v. LeGrand, 67 A.D.2d
446, 453, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252, 257 (2d Dep't 1979); People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d 850, 853-54, 370
N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1010-11 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
100. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
101. Id. at 563-67.
102. Id. at 574-75 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
103. 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972).
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that the disappearance of confidential sources and the voluntary suppression
of news to avoid the burdens of government harassment would threaten the
press's tripartite function to gather, analyze, and disseminate news.' ° 4 The
Court emphasized the lack of direct or prior restraints and ignored the impact
of so-called "indirect" restraints. t05 While recognizing the value of the press to
society, 10 6 the Court justified its position by stating that the press is not easily
intimidated. 10 7 Therefore, the Court said that any resolution of the problems
of harassment and chill could be deferred until the impact was clear.10 8
In addition to the restrictions imposed by these decisions, the Court has
curtailed the public's right to information. 109 A decision such as Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale,110 holding that the right to open court proceedings adheres
only to the defendant's benefit and not to the public's, is a departure from the
historic view that a defendant's rights are often protected by public knowl-
edge of the proceedings.11 1 Without a right of access to court proceedings,
104. 436 U.S. at 565-66 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
105. See American Communs. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (Court noted that lack of
direct restraints does not determine the free speech question and indirect measureb can have the
same coercive effects as imprisonment, fines, injunctions, or taxes); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973) (freedom of the press may be stifled by direct
or indirect restraints, neither of which are tolerated absent a compelling government interestt,
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (court recognized that
to compel disclosure of newsperson's confidential sources in defamation action would encroach
on press freedom by imposing an important practical restraint on the free flow of information to
the news media and public). See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461
(1958) (abridgment of constitutional liberties may inevitably follow even when direct government
action not involved).
106. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978).
107. Id.
108. Id. But see N.Y. Times, June 17, 1978, at 26, col. 4 (Senate consideration of ways to
limit the Zurcher decision).
109. The Court had previously recognized that the freedoms of speech and press necessarily
protect the right to receive information. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); .Martin v
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969), the Court stated that "[ilt is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences .... That right may not constitution-
ally be abridged... by Congress .... ." Presently, the existence of a right to know is an unsettled
proposition. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.. 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (press and general public
have no general right of access to prisons and inmates); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)
(same); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding restrictions on travel to Cuba); Emerson,
Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 Wash. U. L.Q. 1; Gellhorn, The Right to Know:
First Amendment Overbreadth?, 1976 Wash. U. L.Q. 25.
110. 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
111. See, e.g., id. at 2922-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S 333,
349-50 (1966); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-71 (1948). This view stems in part from fears of
secret trials and Star Chamber justice that are facilitated by closed proceedings. See Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2936 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The New York Court of
Appeals recently interpreted Gannett, a New York case, as not requiring closure of all pretrial
hearings. It invalidated a closure order of a pre-trial competency hearing. The Court of Appeals
emphasized that pre-trial proceedings are presumptively open to the public. Westchester Rock-
land Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 439-40, 399 N.E.2d 518, 523-24, 423
N.Y.S.2d 630, 635-36 (1979).
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there is no protection of the public's interest in open proceedings. 112 More-
over, Gannett considerably lowers the criteria for a permissible infringement
of public access to information from the compelling interest standard'" by
allowing exclusion of the public even when it is "not strictly and inescapably
necessary." 114
The Court has also been inconsistent in its view of the public interest in the
fair administration of justice.115 The dissent in Gannett noted that the
majority had "cast aside as of little value or significance" the important
interest of the public and the press in open judicial proceedings. 116 The
Court, however, has asserted the same public interest to override the press's
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of sources. 117 Furthermore, Gannett
creates the potential for widespread secrecy in the criminal justice system,, 18
thereby fostering many avenues for abuse by law enforcement officials. 119
The Court's assertion that the effects of these decisions are speculative and
uncertain has been refuted by the enactment of shield laws in more than half
112. The public has an interest in the fair administr'ation of justice that is facilitated by first
hand knowledge of the activities of the criminal justice system. To formulate informed policy
decisions, the public must know whether prosecutions are becoming means of persecution and
whether law enforcement officialt are effectively and impartially fulfilling public expectations.
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. at 2922, 2939 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Gannett
left broad discretion in the hands of the trial judge to exclude the public from pre-trial
suppression of evidence hearings, at the defendant's request, and with the agreement of all
participants in the litigation, if publicity may threaten the selection of an impartial jury. Id.
at 2913. Broad discretion provides many avenues for coercing the defendant to surrender Ills
constitutional rights. A corrupt, biased, or incompetent judge may wish to be insulated from
public scrutiny. The prosecution may wish to hide police or prosecutorial misconduct. A judge or
prosecutor who seeks to obtain a conviction free from error may have no incentive, as a result of
Gannett, to assert the public interest when the accused moves to close a proceeding. Id. at
2935-36.
113. DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
439 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); see Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
114. 99 S. Ct. at 2904.
115. Compare Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979) (public has no constitutional
right of access to attend courtroom proceedings) with Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (public
right to be informed is satisfied by media's attendance at court proceedings).
116. 99 S. Ct. at 2919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688-91 (1972).
118. The reality of potential abuse has been demonstrated in at least one case in which an
entire trial was conducted behind closed doors. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (Va.
Sup. Ct. July 9, 1979), jurisdiction postponed to hearing on the merits, 100 S. Ct. 204 (1979) (No.
79-243). The possibilities engendered by such a standard are ominous. Attempts to close criminal
proceedings increased after Gannett. See Goodale, Gannett Means What It Says; But Who
Knows What It Says? Nat'l L.J., Oct. 15, 1979, at 20, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1979, § A, at
27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 5. See also Keefe, The Boner called Gannett,
66 A.B.A. J. 227 (1980).
119. Many press groups and the American Civil Liberties Union had joined with Gannett in
appealing the state court decision, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977).
They feared the holding might "signal routine establishment of secret pretrial proceedings."
N.Y.L.J., July 3, 1979, at 24, col. 2.
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the states in response to the Court's invitation in Branzbutrg to determine the
existence of a privilege independently.12 0 The use of state shield laws to
protect newsgathering, however, is unsatisfactory in two respects. First, the
news media have generally become national, not statewide, enterprises.12'
The inconsistent response of the several states to the confidential source
dilemma has resulted in the creation of a "checkerboard" privilege, varying in
scope from nonexistent to absolute according to geographic location.' 2 2 Sec-
ond, state law is subject to constitutional attack. 12 3 It is virtually impossible
for a newsperson, at the time the promise of confidentiality must be given, to
120. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). Twenty-six states presently havie shield
laws. M. Van Gerpen, supra note 11, at 126. These statutes vary in the degree of protection they
afford the press. For example, New Jersey's shield law extends a testimonial privilege to the
entire news media "to refuse to disclose, in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any
investigative body, including, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit jury, administrative
agency, the Legislature or legislative committee, or elsewhere. a. the source, author, means,
agency or person from or through whom any information was procured ,. . and b. Any news or
information obtained in the course of pursuing his professional activities whether or not it is
disseminated." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1979). As a result of In re Farber, 78 N.J.
259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978), the New Jersey legislature amended the shield
law to provide added protection for newspersons against attempts to compel disclosure by criminal
defendants. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1980, § B, at 2, col. 1. The Arkansas statute apparently excludes
television from its coverage. It grants a privilege against compelled disclosure, subject to divestment
on a showing "that such article was written, published or broadcast in bad faith, with malice, and
not in the interest of the public welfare." Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-917 (1947). The Michigan legislature
has granted a testimonial privilege only to media representatives of "newspapers or other publica-
tions." Mlich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767.5a (1968). Although the New Jersey shield law protects both
the source of information and the information itself, some statutes, such as Arizona's, apply only to
disclosure of the informant's identity. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1979). Despite the
strong wording in a shield law, the statutory language is subject to judicial construction, which
has at times removed testimonial protection. For example, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.100 (1970)
provides: "No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial before any
court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before the presiding officer of any tribunal, or his
agent or agents, or before the general assembly, or any committee thereof, or before any city or
county legislative body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information
procured or obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or by a radio or television
broadcasting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is connected." The
Kentucky Court of Appeals construed this statute as affording a newsperson the privilege of
refusing to disclose the identity of an informant who supplied him with information, but held that
it did not permit a reporter to refuse to testify about events he had personally observed, including
the identities of those involved. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Ky. 1970), aff'd sub
nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
121. See Dep't of Justice, Hearings on Media Concentration Before the Subcomm. on General
Oversight and Minority Enterprise of the House Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
15-16 (1980) (statistics reflecting national increase in concentration in newspaper business) (testimony
of Sanford Litvack). These materials are presently unpublished. This testimony is on file with the
Fordham Law Review.
122. See Edelstein & LoBue, Journalist's Privilege and the Criminal Defendant, 47 Fordham
L. Rev. 913, 924 (1979); 23 Cath. L. Rev. 41, 42-43 (1977).
123. See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 271, 394 A.2d 330, 336, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978);
Note, A Study in Governmental Separation of Powers: Judicial Response to State Shield Laws,
66 Geo. L.J. 1273 (1978).
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know whether his privilege will be upheld. 12 4 Although the newsperson may
stand by his pledge of confidentiality and refuse to disclose his informant's
identity, the dual threats of fines and imprisonment may have a significant
adverse impact on the reporter's enthusiasm to investigate a story. The threats
to American democracy that lurk behind press curtailment mandate the
finding that a constitutional privilege of confidentiality between a newsperson
and a press informant adheres under the free press clause of the first
amendment.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE
The contours of a newsperson's privilege should be drawn in light of those
press functions that primarily serve the public interest. When acting in this
capacity, the societal benefits derived from a truly free press outweigh any
incidental conflicts that may arise. A distinctiqn should be made between
reports involving public and private figures, based on that used by the
Supreme Court in defamation cases. 1 25 Other requirements for claiming the
privilege, and limitations on its application, are necessary to alleviate
difficulties that a press privilege would allegedly create. 126 Furthermore, a
procedure whereby certain criminal defendants may require judicial divest-
ment of the privilege is also necessary.
A. Circumstances Under which the Privilege Should Be Applicable
1. Facilitation of Democratic Processes
When the newsperson is gathering information on matters that are public
questions 2 7 and that "enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
124. For example, in Farber, the newsperson claimed a privilege of confidentiality under tile
first amendment and the New Jersey shield law "said to be as strongly worded as any in the
country." In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 270, 394 A.2d 330, 335, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). The
court held that the sixth amendment right of the defendant to compulsory process took precedence
over the shield law, although it found that Myron Farber came within the language of the law. Id.
at 269-74, 394 A.2d at 335-37. See also In re Hadenguest, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1980, at 13, col. 4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). In Farber, it is possible that Myron Farber may not have had a
constitutionally based privilege because of his unusual degree of responsibility for the prosecution
of Dr. Jascalevich. 78 N.J. at 289, 394 A.2d at 345 (Pashman, J., dissenting); see notes 59 supra,
159 infra.
125. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 2701, 2706 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974); see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
126. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691, 705 (1972). The requirements for invoking
the privilege, and the corresponding limitations on its exercise, should circumvent several
suggested problems of abuse by the newsperson or the defendant. See pts. III (A)-(C) i~ra. First,
there is the suggested possibility of collusion between the defendant and a purported newsperson.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 n.40 (1972) (Court concerned that "sham" newspa-
pers would claim testimonial privileges); M. Van Gerpen, supra note 11, at 172. Second, there Is
the possible nonexistence of an actual confidential source. Id. Third, the possibility exists that tile
person seeking to avoid testifying is not genuinely a member of the press. The Court has
expressed concern that any person who publishes virtually anything-papers, periodicals, pam-
phlets, or leaflets-could claim a newsperson's privilege of confidentiality. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 704-05 (1972). This problem is averted, however, by requiring the claimant to be a
bona fide newsperson.
" 127. Public questions should include reports on official actions, conduct, or misconduct,
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their period, ' 128 the newsperson should be privileged to maintain the anonymity
of his source. The threshold inquiry, therefore, is whether the newsperson is
functioning in the capacity to which the framers sought to extend the highest
degree of constitutional protection. It is impossible to define precisely all areas of
investigation that involve matters of importance to public decisionmaking.1 29
The concept of politically relevant matters, however, should be construed
broadly. 130
The definition of a public question should accord with the "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials. 1 3 1 The privilege should adhere when the information disclosed by the
investigation is recognizable as a means to check government honesty, compe-
tence, and receptiveness to the people.1 32 Investigation into areas relevant to
the health, safety, or welfare of the public, or those affecting public policy-
making should also be within the scope of the privilege.
In making the threshold determination, a distinction must be drawn
between matters of public interest-those facilitating the political operation of
a democratic society-and matters of public curiosity. The disparity of
treatment between these two areas is logical when viewed within the histori-
cal rationale for protecting the free press. ' 33 Although esoteric and sensational
stories concerning diverse and isolated events may be "of public interest,"
their relevance in terms of informed involvement in democratic processes is
minimal. No privilege should be available in these instances.
2. Public Versus Private Defendants
Once the threshold inquiry has been satisfied, the privilege should only
adhere when the criminal defendant is a public figure. The Supreme Court has
government policy and practices, and matters bearing on the effectiveness of American represen-
tative democracy, such as responsiveness to the electorate, and corrupt or suspect corporate
dealings.
128. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
129. Professor Meiklejohn's example is illustrative of the difficulty of precise definition: -In
cases of private defamation, one individual does damage to another by tongue or pen; the person
so injured in reputation.. . may sue for damages. But, in that case, the First Amendment gives
no protection to the person sued. His verbal attack has no relation to the business of governing.
If, however, the same verbal attack is made in order to show the unfitness of a candidate for
governmental office, the act is properly regarded as a citizen's participation in government. It is,
therefore, protected by the First Amendment. And the same principle holds good [for] ....
'public' issues cbncerning which, under our form of government, he has authority, and is assumed
to have competence, to judge." Meiklejohn, supra note 34, at 259.
130. See Green, Political Freedom of the Press and the Libel Problem, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 341
(1978).
131. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); accord, Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); see Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936);
Stromberk v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 975 (2d Cir.
1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
132. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
133. See pt. I(A) supra.
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employed the public figure/private figure distinction in civil litigation and has
allowed the press greater freedom regarding public figures. 134
The rationale underlying the distinction stems from a recognition that the
press must be protected by the first amendment when it is reporting on
matters of public concern. 135 The press, however, occasionally oversteps its
constitutionally protected role and abuses its resources to the detriment of a
private individual who is more easily injured and less able to defend himself
than a public figure.136 Additionally, information concerning private figures
on matters not of public concern "has little to do with the political ends of a
self-governing society." 1 3 7 Furthermore, the private individual who is sus-
pected of criminal conduct is more likely to be zealously investigated by the
criminal justice system. 138 In these instances, the press need not be afforded a
great degree of protection to serve the public interest because, presumably, the
government is serving the public. The proposed distinction is justified because a
public figure is more likely to have resources at his disposal to conduct his own
investigation and to uncover the same information discovered by the newsperson,
without forcing disclosure of the source's identity. 139 This is not true of an obscure
criminal defendant, however, who may not have the resources to hire an attorney
or to conduct an extensive investigation. Therefore, he is even more disadvan-
taged by nondisclosure. 140 Moreover, past cases in which investigative reporting
134. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-47 (1974) (lower standard of
proof required of private plaintiff to recover damages for defamation) with New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public official must prove "actual malice" to recover
damages for defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct).
135. See notes 22-28 supra and accompanying text.
136. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 272-73, 282-83 (1964).
137. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
138. Justice Blackmun has noted that the prosecutor and the judge cannot always adequately
protect the public interest. Speaking in reference to closure of court proceedings, he stated: "The
specter of a trial or suppression hearing where a defendant of the same political party as the
prosecutor and the judge-both of whom are elected officials perhaps beholden to the very
defendant they are to try-obtains closure of the proceeding without any consideration for the
substantial public interest at stake is sufficiently real to cause me to reject the Court's suggestion
that the parties be given complete discretion to dispose of the public's interest as they see fit."
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2935 (1979) (dissenting opinion).
139. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-48 (1974). The Court determined that
requiring different standards of proof for private and public figures would provide maximum
protection for those individuals least able to protect themselves, "while simultaneously producing
a minimum of self-censorship for press discussion of public interest matters." Note, Public
Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 157, 157 (1977). See also Murasky,
The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg ind Its Aftermath, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 829, 892-98 (1974).
140. Although there may appear to be an equal protection problem in recognizing a privilege
only when public figures are the subject of press investigation, the rationales offered for the
distinction constitute a rational basis sufficient to overcome assertions of a denial of equal
protection. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1977) (refusal by state to fund nontherapeu-
tic abortions does not violate equal protection clause because it bears rational relationship to
legitimate state interest in encouraging normal childbirth); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150
(1976) (permissibility of distinction dependent on its degree and the justification for the
classification); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 6.32-33 (1974) (classifications presumed
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required the use of confidential sources were generally matters of public
concern.14 When prosecution ensued, either as the result of a newsperson's
investigation, or independently, most defendants fit within the characterization of
public figures. 142 Therefore, a privilege of confidentiality will rarely prejudice a
criminal defendant. 14 3
When the press investigates public figures or issues of public concern, when
the government is directly the subject of investigation, or when the individual
is in a position to exert either political or economic influence over those
normally charged with investigation of suspect conduct, the diminished
motivation of law enforcement officials to conduct an investigation supports
attachment of the privilege. 144 Self-preservation tendencies may initially lead
to less vigorous investigation, or to an inquiry that is chilled by threats or
payoffs. When the public interest in disclosure is not being furthered by the
government, the press should be free to function independently in conducting
investigations. 145 Under these circumstances, the press acts as a check on
government activities. 1
46
As the distinction between the public and private sectors becomes blurred,
the difficulty of making the public figure determination increases. 147 Public
figures would, at least, include all government officials, political candidates,
corporate officers, labor leaders, and figures of general notoriety,148 when the
subject of the investigation has "political" significance to the public.' 49 The
term political significance should be defined expansively because exposure to a
broad range of information is necessary for the formulation of knowledgeable
opinions. 150
The privilege should withstand the defendant's assertion of an inability to
receive a fair trial because he cannot compel process of a witness. Failure to
rational when no fundamental right or suspect criteria are involved if any facts exist that would
justify the classification); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)
(rational relationship to legitimate state purpose is test of classification, absent presence of a
suspect class or infringement on a fundamental right, both of which require strict scrutiny). The
degree to which the public interest would be furthered, the accessibility of public figures to resources
for conducting an independent, in depth investigation, and the potential prejudice to obscure
individuals suspected of crime support the classification in this instance.
141. See note 66 supra.
142. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 556-57.
143. See id. at 557; Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 51; Murasky, supra note 139, at
866-70; notes 245-47 infra and accompanying text.
144. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.11 (1978).
145. See note 138 supra.
146. See notes 23, 138 supra.
147. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
148. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974), the Court considered "public
figures" to be individuals who achieve pervasive fame or notoriety, as well as those who
voluntarily inject themselves or are drawn into a public controversy. Figures of general notoriety
would therefore include "persons [who] assume special prominence in the resolution of public
questions . . . . and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society." Id. at 351-52.
149. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301-02 (1964); see M. Van Gerpen,
supra note 11, at 95.
150. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (exposure to vast range of information
"is a concomitant of life in a civilized community").
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obtain a witness does not automatically constitute a denial of sixth amend-
ment rights. 151 Compulsory process has never been recognized as an absolute
right because of the existence of common law and constitutional testimonial
privileges. 152
The privilege should be presumptively available to avoid the chill inherent
in ad hoc determinations, subsequent to the time the guarantee of
confidentiality was given, of whether a communication was privileged. It
should also be expansive in view of the importance of the press function, the
potential dangers from infringement, and the undesirability of leaving open
numerous avenues for government harassment if the privilege is too weak. '-3
The privilege should not automatically adhere, however, even when the
defendant is a public figure and the investigation concerns a public matter;
other requirements must be imposed.
B. Protection Limited to Bona Fide Newspersons
To minimize the instances in which recognition of a privilege may prejudice
a defendant, and to avoid abusive claims of confidential relationships, the
privilege should extend only to bona fide newspersons. A Senate bill propos-
ing the creation of a newsperson's testimonial privilege included criteria
defining "a legitimate member of the professional news media."'1 54 The
legislation defined a bona fide newsperson as "an individual regularly engaged
in earning his or her principal income, or .. .gathering, collecting, photo-
graphing, filming, writing, editing, interpreting, announcing, or broadcasting
local, national, or worldwide events or other matters of public concern, or
public interest, or affecting the public welfare, for publication or transmission
through a news medium.'15 Although the legislative criteria would have
151. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
152. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). See also Hearings, supra note 24, at
557 (Statement of the Citizen's Right to Know Committee); Zion, High Court vs. the Press, N.Y
Times, Nov. 18, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 76, col. 1, at 145, col. 3.
153. Government harassment that may result from loopholes includes exploratory investiga-
tion at the expense of the press that creates uncertainty between reporters and sources; annexation
of the press as an investigative arm of the government; and intimidation of sources by vindictive
prosecutors. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 744 n.34 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
154. S. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1973), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 24, at 422.
155. Id. at 422-23. S. 318 defined news medium as "any individual, partnership, corporation,
or other association engaged in the business of--() publishing any newspaper that is printed and
distributed ordinarily not less frequently than once a week, and has done so for at least one year,
or has a paid general circulation and has been entered at a United States post office as
second-class matter, and that contains news, or articles of opinion (as editorials), or features, or
advertising, or other matter regarded as of current interest; or (2) publishing any periodical
containing news, or advertising, or other matter regarded as of current interest which is published
and distributed at regular intervals, and has done so for at least one year, or has a paid general
circulation and has been entered at a United States post office as second-class matter; or (3)
collecting and supplying news, as a 'news agency,' for subscribing newspapers, and/or peri-
odicals, and/or news broadcasting facilities; or (4) sending out syndicated news copy by wire, as a
'wire service,' to subscribing newspapers, and/or periodicals, and/or news broadcasting facilities;
or (5) gathering and distributing news as a 'press association' to its members as an association of
newspapers, and/or periodicals, and/or news broadcasting facilities; or (6) broadcasting as a
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defined the press more restrictively than the Supreme Court, which focuses
more on a personal right of self expression than on the institutional press,' S6
the sharper delineation is necessary to allay judicial fears that anyone who
prints any item could unjustifiably claim the press privilege.' S7
Any defendant may assert that the reporter did not come within the
meaning of a bona fide newsperson. The privilege of confidentiality is
intended to protect free press rather than to provide added protection for free
speech. Therefore, the institutional press must be distinguished from the
"press" that emerges from the Supreme Court's free expression rubric that
combines the freedoms of speech and press.'" 8
C. Other Limitations on the Privilege's Availability
The motive underlying recognition of a press privilege of confidentiality is
the need to preserve and increase the free flow of politically relevant informa-
tion to the public. The privilege should not provide a license for irresponsibil-
ity by the news media insofar as the existence of the privilege may render it
increasingly more difficult to check the accuracy of press reporting. Therefore,
the privilege should be limited to newspersons who conduct investigations in
"good faith." No privilege should attach when a substantial probability can be
shown that the newsperson began the investigation for personal reasons or
solely to profit from publication.' 9
commercially licensed radio station; or (7) broadcasting as a commercially licensed television
station; or (8) broadcasting as a community antenna television service; or (9) regularly making
newsreels or other motion picture news for paid general public showing." Id. § 3 tb). at 423-24
The requirements for a bona fide newsperson should be more stringent than the Supreme Court's
definition of the press as including pamphlets, leaflets, and "every sort of publication which
affords a vehicle of information and opinion." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938). The more limited definition, such as the one given in S. 318, lessens the likelihood that
reliance on the privilege will be abused.
156. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938).
157. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05, 705 n.40 (1972). The Supreme Court's
fear that recognition of a press testimonial privilege would give rise to substantial difficulties in
excluding certain publications from the privilege's protection is attributable to the Court's merger
of speech and press into a general right of freedom of expression. Id. at 704. The Court views
press freedom as an extension of individual freedom. As a result, pamphlets, leaflets, and other
similar printed material are considered encompassed by the press clause, along with the
institutional press-newspapers, magazines, television, and radio. Id. This failure to distinguish
between personal expression and the press has caused the Court's dilemma in determining to
whom the privilege should apply. It has also created the potential problem that any member of
society could print anything and claim the first amendment privilege of confidentiality to elude
testifying. Id. at 705 n.40. This difficulty does not arise when speech and press are not equated.
The free speech clause secures to the people the freedom of expression. The press clause, on the
other hand, should be interpreted as applying only to the institutional press. When free expression
is divided into the two concepts specified in the first amendment, the difficulty of drawing the line
as to who may claim the press privilege is removed.
158. See Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 225, 225-28; note 157 supra.
159. The judge in In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997
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The privilege should apply only if the newsperson promised confidential-
ity160 to the informant and if nondisclosure is necessary because there is a
recognizable potential for reprisals. Underlying these requirements is the
concern that the privilege should attach only when it is required to secure the
full constitutional guarantee of a freely functioning press. 16 1 When the
defendant can demonstrate that confidentiality has not been promised, or that
it would serve only to insulate the informant from lawful sanctions for
disclosing information, there is no reason to determine whether the accused is
a public or private defendant.
The newsperson's privilege should also be unavailable when the newsper-
son functions as an agent of the prosecution with the obvious purpose of
bringing about an indictment and conviction,' 62 and with no primary interest
in informing the public, even when the defendant is unmistakably a public
figure involved in a matter of public concern.163 Because the framers sought
to protect press independence from government, 64 when the press becomes
an extension of government, the first amendment protection should yield to
the sixth amendment right of the accused.
(1978), felt that the success of Myron Farber's book on the investigation of the murders was
dependent on a conviction of Dr. Jascalevich. See Mowlana & Logue, supra note 60, at 31. A
reporter should not be able to claim the privilege when he is apparently using confidentiality to
mask inaccuracies in his news stories that lend a sensational tone to the events, thereby attracting
greater public attention and sales. Malice is another example of bad faith. The newsperson may
not claim the benefits of the privilege to inflict injury vindictively.
160. For example, in Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct.
1977), the court held that the newsperson had not expressly or implicitly promised confidentiality
to the source.
161. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 729-31 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (rationale
underlying press-informant privilege).
162. Myron Farber's investigation led to the publication of approximately 14 articles in tile
New York Times suggesting that Dr. Mario Jascalevich may have been responsible for the
deaths. During the pre-indictment period, Farber was closely associated with the prosecutor's
office and was instrumental in bringing about the indictment. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394
A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); see Mowlana & Logue, supra note 60, at 30-31. At
the time the investigation was conducted and the indictment instigated, Farber was under
contract to write a book about the alleged curare murders. The likelihood of the book's success,
based on the sensational and bizarre circumstances of the deaths, would apparently have been
enhanced by Dr. Jascalevich's conviction. Although he refused to provide information for the
defense, Farber apparently had gone to the prosecutor with sources of information sufficient to
cause the case to be reopened. 78 N.J. at 279-80, 394 A.2d at 340. Therefore, his interest was not
primarily in protecting sources of information from disclosure, but in keeping potentially helpful
material from the defendant. The lack of objectivity on the reporter's part in conducting the
investigation, the presence of a special interest overriding the public interest involved, and it close
alignment of the press with the government against an accused, demonstrated a primary
motivation other than that of informing the public.
163. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text. This limitation will rarely result in
disclosure of an anonymous source because it is infrequently shown that the newsperson acted as
an arm of the prosecutor. More often, the press is wary of government attempts to annex the
news media as an investigative arm, thereby destroying its independence and eviscerating its
function. See note 153 supra.
164. See notes 17-27 supra and accompanying text.
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D. Criteria Requiring that the Privilege Yield
When the individual asserting a sixth amendment right against a newsper-
son is a private defendant, 16- the privilege may be overcome. The determi-
nation of whether the privilege should yield is, necessarily, an ad hoc decision
requiring judicial inquiry into the facts of each case. The defendant should be
required to show a high degree of necessity to be entitled to disclosure. He
must demonstrate the existence of several criteria. First, the information
sought must appear to go to the heart of the action. 166 There must be a strong
likelihood that the information will be relevant and material on the issue of
guilt or innocence. 1 67 Second, alternative means of acquiring the information
must have been exhausted. 168 Third, he must be seeking disclosure in good
faith. This prohibits defense counsel from gambling on the newsperson's
refusal to disclose the informant's identity, thereby allowing for an acquittal
or an appeal on the ground that the trial was unfair, even though he knows
the information the newsperson possesses will not aid his case.
169
165. See notes 139-40, 148 supra and accompanying text.
166. See Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 634 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938
(1974); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547, 551 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). A
number of jurisdictions employ an ad hoc determination termed a "heart of the claim" test. M.
Van Gerpen, supra note 11, at 123. The existence of a newsperson's privilege depends on the
necessity of the confidential information to the lawsuit. This in turn requires the party seeking
disclosure to demonstrate the relevance of the information and the unavailability of alternative
sources. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (D.D.C. 1973); Baker
v. F & F Inv., 339 F. Supp. 942, 943 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
167. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394. 1398 (D.D.C. 1973); State v.
St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 270, 315 A.2d 254, 256 (1974).
168. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 638 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974). See
also Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (D.D.C. 1973). It has been
suggested that the burden of showing the exhaustion of alternate means be placed on the
prosecution. See M. Van Gerpen, supra note 11, at 78. It is illogical to put the burden on the
press because it may trap the newsperson into inadvertently revealing his source to those seeking
reprisal or harassment. Presumably, the defendant, an obscure private figure, is unable to
conduct the type of investigation necessary to satisfy this criterion. The government is in the best
position to safeguard both the defendant's and the press's rights and to further the public's interest
in a fair and accurate adjudication of the issue. Additionally, it is in the prosecution's best interest
for all essential information to surface to stop the defendant from claiming a sixth amendment
violation. Id.
169. See Mowlana & Logue, supra note 60, at 31. In In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 276-77, 394
A.2d 330, 338-39, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978), the court held that a newsperson could
refrain from revealing his sources except on legitimate demand. A demand is clearly not
legitimate when the desired information is patently irrelevant to the inquiring party's needs or
when his needs are not manifestly compelling. Other tests have been proposed or used by courts.
They are: (1) The privilege yields only if the information is " 'the missing link in the chain of
evidence' to prove guilt or innocence." M. Van Gerpen, supra note 11, at 172. Vagueness is an
inherent difficudty with this test. Additionally, it is difficult to determine the relevance of the
information to such a presice point without using in camera disclosure to weight the evidence. See
In re Farber, 78 N.J. at 284-85, 394 A.2d at 343 (Pashman, J.. dissenting) (illogic of requiring
in camera disclosure before privilege of nondisclosure will be upheld); Mowlana & Logue, supra
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The proposed press privilege would permit first and sixth amendment rights
to exist in tandem while allowing maximum recognition of the respective
guarantees. The Supreme Court's present interpretation of first and sixth
amendment rights, however, fails to recognize the possibility of harmonious
coexistence. 170 Furthermore, the Court is inconsistent, fluctuating according
to the identity of the party exercising a right and the party-whether it be a
criminal defendant, the government, or the press-asserting a superficially
incompatible interest.
note 60, at 31. (2) The privilege yields when there is a compelling and overriding interest that
cannot alternatively be served. See Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (M.D. Fla.
1975). This standard is too high. It is generally employed only when a substantial chill of first
amendment rights is involved. When such a compelling and overriding interest exists, the bulk of
the threatened press burden has already been removed by recognition of the constitutional
privilege. (3) Whether the privilege must yield is dependent on the type of crime being
prosecuted. See Note, Chipping Away at the First Amendment: Newspapermen Must Disclose
Sources, 7 Akron L. Rev. 129, 148 (1973). A defendant's rights, however, should not depend on
the degree of seriousness that society attaches to the alleged criminal act. The test is inconsistent
because a defendant charged with a more serious crime would have an advantage in gaining
defense witnesses over a defendant charged with a lesser infraction. State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan.
573, 576, 581 P.2d 812, 815 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979) (court rejected ideas that a
criminal prosecution automatically requires disclosure or that the crime charged is dispositive of
whether disclosure could be compelled). (4) The Branzburg test examines whether the information
sought is relevant to issues before the tribunal. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972);
State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573$ 576, 581 P.2d 812, 815 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929
(1979). This raises a problem of precisely defining "relevant." For example, Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 defines as relevant "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." Relevance can thus be construed in almost any way. (5) One
court recognized a qualified privilege that would be defeated whenever it conflicts with a criminal
defendant's right to a fair trial. This conflict exists when there are reasonable grounds to believe a
reporter's information is material to establish an element of a crime, a defense to a reduction in
the classification of the crime charged, or mitigation of the penalty. Brown v. Commonwealth,
214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974). (6) Proposals of Senator
Schweiker in S. 36 combine elements of all the prior tests. S. 36 makes the newsperson's privilege
absolute but subject to divestment. The criteria that must be met to divest the privilege are
stringent. See S. 36, 93d Cong. Ist Sess. (1973), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 24, at 409-11.
(7) When the future ability of the press to obtain information would be adversely affected by
disclosure and the party has not shown that the information is unavailable through other sources,
the reporter is privileged to maintain anonymity. See Apicella v. McNeil Labs, Inc., 66 F.R.D.
78, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
170. Despite claims that the two interests cannot coexist, the Supreme Court does have the
means to accommodate both freedom of the press and the sixth amendment guarantee of
compulsory process of witnesses. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587-88 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan rejected the idea that first and sixth amendment rights
conflict in a manner "that cannot be resolved without essentially abrogating one right or the
other." Id. at 612. Courts should not choose between them, "[flor although there may in some
instances be tension between uninhibited and robust reporting by the press and fair trials for
criminal defendants, judges possess adequate tools [short of curtailing rights] for relieving that
tension." Id. See also Brant, supra note 34, at 898-99; Meiklejohn, supra note 34, at 245.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S INCONSISTENCY IN INTERPRETING FIRST AND
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. The First Amendment
1. Pure Speech
The Court has often asserted that freedom of the press is a mere subdivision
of the more important, fundamental right of free speech that encompasses the
expression of concepts and opinions. ' 71 Under this analysis, newsgathering is
characterized as activity merely supportive of speech 7 2 and is therefore
considered "speech plus."' 173 The Court affords pure speech or expression t 4 a
high degree of constitutional protection that is denied to "incidental ac-
tivities.' 175 Because the Court views newsgathering as only facilitating free
press,176 and confidentiality as a mere aid to newsgathering, confidentiality is
considered even further removed from speech and its protections.' 7 7
171. According to the traditional pure speech analysis, "the primary purpose of the First
Amendment is more or less absolutely to prohibit any interference with freedom of expression.
S. . Indeed, this model sometimes depicts the press as simply a collection of individuals who wish
to speak out and broadly disseminate their views." Brennan, supra note 21, at 15; see Blanchard,
supra note 158, at 226 (in 1977 term, the Supreme Court reinforced single standard for rights and
privileges afforded to press and speech).
172. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563-67 (1978); Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972).
173. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 715 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (speech or belief
not connected with action is beyond rightful concern of government); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30
(1971) (state may not penalize individual for beliefs absent conduct); Baird v. State Bar. 401 U.S.
1, 7 (1971) (determining competence to practice law is legitimate state interest, but inquiries into
beliefs are precluded by first amendment); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943) (first amendment precludes government intrusion into "sphere of intellect" but
is not a rigid bar to state regulation of conduct).
174. See Right of the Press, supra note 24, at 840-41; Note, The Rights of the Public and the
Press to Gather Information, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1505, 1507 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rights to
Gather].
175. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972).
176. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565-66 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 680-82 (1972).
177. See Right of the Press, supra note 24. In Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204
S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974), the court stated that "as a news-gathering
mechanism, a newsman's privilege of confidentiality of information and identity of his source is
an important catalyst to the free flow of information guaranteed by the freedom of press clause of
the First Amendment. Unknown at common law, it is a privilege related to the First Amendment
and not a First Amendment right, absolute, universal, and paramount to all other rights." Id. at
757, 204 S.E.2d at 431 (emphasis in original). The Second Circuit strained to find that the
Supreme Court was using the traditional first amendment analysis regarding the press, under
which there are few cases that hold first amendment rights must yield to a compelling and
overriding interest. The court rationalized the Branzburg holding by stating that the Supreme
Court, in applying the traditional first amendment doctrine, found the interest in the integrity of
the grand jury as an investigative arm of the criminal justice system to be a compelling
government interest. Therefore, the first amendment rights yielded. Baker v. F & F Inv., 470
F.2d 778, 783-85 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); see Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F.
Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975), in which the court held that a plaintiff in a civil litigation would
have to demonstrate a compelling interest to force discovery of information regarding a news-
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In other circumstances, the Court has recognized a peripheral sphere of
freedoms under the penumbra of enumerated rights, 8 The Court has prop-
erly noted that such rights could not otherwise be meaningfully exercised nor
secured from abridgment. 17 9 The penumbra rationale is as strong when
applied to freedom of the press. Newsgathering and confidentiality must be
safeguarded to make dissemination an effectively exercisable right. The illogic
of subordinating freedom of the press to freedom of speech is evident from the
specific incorporation of a free press clause in the Bill of Rights. 180 The Court
has never treated other enumerated freedoms as subdivisions of more funda-
mental ones.' 8 ' The existence of the Bill of Rights should prohibit the Court
from creating a hierarchy dependent on the party asserting the right. 182
Furthermore, it is inherently inconsistent to have virtually limitless rights to
express opinions and to debate public issues when public access to informa-
tion' 83 necessary for the intelligent and significant exercise of these rights is
restricted or denied. 184
The Court's preoccupation with pure expression has led to a pure speech/
speech plus analysis in free press areas. 185 Pure expression is protected from
paper article if the reporter refused to supply the material sought. The court held that such
discovery would have a chilling effect on the reporter's functioning and on the free flow of
information that the first amendment protects. Id. at 1303. Compare Riley v. City of Chester, No.
79-2528 (3d Cir. Dec 14, 1979) (journalists have federal common law privilege to refuse to
disclose sources) with Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974) (noting that newsperson's privilege is unkown at common law).
178. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-31 (1969) (framers considered right to
travel so fundamental to existence of a strong Union that it was not specifically enumerated);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965) (right of privacy included in penumbra of
first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendment rights, though not expressly mentioned); NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (right of privacy in one's association
necessarily included within the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943) (freedom to distribute literature necessarily protects the
right to receive it).
179. The Court felt that without recognition of these "peripheral" rights, the specifically
enumerated rights would be less meaningful and secure. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482-85 (1965); see Reporters and Their Sources, supra note 92, at 327-34.
180. See notes 16-26 supra and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n,4 (1938) ("[tlhere
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments . . ."). The Court has labelled the guarantees in the Bill of Rights as
"preferred" rights. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). Government power has
been excluded from the spheres of freedom of expression, association, and religion, and the right
of privacy, absent a compelling justification for intrusion. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945).
182. The Federalist No. 84, at 573-74 (A. Hamilton) (Ford ed. 1898). See also Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 572-73, 587-88, 611 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
183. American Communs. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (recognition that
newspapers cannot print news that they are prevented from gathering).
184. The right to gather news as a corollary to a meaningful right to disseminate is analogous
to protecting the right to receive literature as an essential component of the freedom to distribute.
The Supreme Court protected the right to receive in Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
143 (1943).
185. The free speech/free press dichotomy results in a disparity in the protection afforded the
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any restraint absent a showing of a compelling government interest. 8 6
Expression combined with other activities is protected only from direct
burdens.1 87 To invalidate an indirect restraint, a substantial and certain
chilling of the speech itself must be proved, rather than mere adverse effects
on the activities preparatory or incidental to the pure expression.' 88
Unlike freedom of speech, the press clause centers on dissemination of
politically valuable information to the public.' 89 The press, however, cannot
properly disseminate if it cannot effectively gather. Restraint on newsgather-
ing vitiates a substantial part of press freedom. What the Court labels
permissible "indirect" restraints on newsgathering activities are not, as a
practical matter, at all indirect.190
By employing the pure speech/speech plus analysis that arose in free
speech, not free press cases, the Court has held that newsgathering is a mere
incident to pure speech.' 91 In Branzburg v. Hayes, 192 the Court characterized
denial of a press privilege as a permissible indirect restraint on newsgather-
ing. 193 It continues to label the media's fears as uncertain and speculative.'
9 4
The Court has apparently been more reluctant than Congress and various
state legislatures to view the right to know as equivalent in importance to the
right of free expression, and to recognize the threat resulting from compelled
disclosure of press sources.' 9 s
Although the Court purports to protect newsgathering by precluding direct
or prior restraints, unlimited indirect inhibition is upheld. Because most of the
respective rights. See Brennan, supra note 21, at 15, 31; Right of the Press, supra note 24, at
840-41; Rights to Gather, supra note 174, at 1507.
186. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
187. Indirect burdens are justified by the showing of a rational basis. See, e.g., Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-19 (1972) (reasonable regulation of means of expression
permissible to further legitimate state interest); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972)
(picketing may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions).
188. See notes 171-77 supra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
190. See American Communs. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382. 402 (1950) (indirect restraints
may be as coercive as direct restraints); cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566-67 (1978)
(warrant to search newspaper's offices does not constitute threat of prior or direct restraint and
Court would deal with problem of press intimidation in the future when effects of warrants are
concretely manifested); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682, 694-95 (1972) (burden of grand
jury subpoena of newspersons held to be incidental, with uncertain and speculative effects).
191. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979) (although closure of courtroom to
press and public restrains access to information, it does not violate the Constitution); Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (reporter's inner thoughts and discussions with editors concerning
published information held discoverable by plaintiff in libel suit); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978) (police searches of newsrooms do not violate first amendment); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (grand jury subpoenas of reporters are permissible despite threat of
disappearance of confidential informant).
192. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
193. Id. at 680-81. But see American Communs. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950),
194. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-99 (1972).
195. See notes 83-88 supra and accompanying text. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 21. 1980, § A,
at 1, col. 4 (Senator Moynihan proposing the elimination of a section from pending bill that
makes it a criminal act for press to disclose names of intelligence agents).
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chill to newsgathering results from indirect government actions, the asserted
protection of newsgathering amounts to little. Furthermore, direct restraints
are rarely found, except in cases of prior restraint, because of the high degree
of harm that must be demonstrated. 196 If newsgathering was recognized as a
fundamental right adhering to the news media under the free press guarantee,
rather than a subordinate part of free speech, interference would be precluded
under traditional first amendment analysis unless the government could
demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest. 197
2. The Public Right/Private Right Dichotomy
A second dichotomy used by the Court when plotting constitutional free-
doms on a hierarchical scale is that of public versus private right. 198 The
Court attaches greater importance to those rights that it considers public. 199
For example, the public has the right to express opinions on official conduct
and activities; 200 to have access to matters of public record;2 1 and, under
certain circumstances, to attend trials. 202 Such rights are considered exercised
for the benefit of the public at large. Other rights are considered private
because they benefit the party receiving the "special privilege." '20 3
Applying these principles to the press, private rights are considered those
that facilitate the business of printing the news. This analysis overlooks any
196. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566-67 (1978); Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
197. DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 439 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v, Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
198. The public figure/private figure distinction deals with the significance of particular
information to the public. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 301-02 (1964). The Supreme Court's private right/public right dichotomy, however, refers to
the ability and the extent to which a party may exercise a constitutional right, See First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782-85 (1978); Nixon v. Warner Communs., Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
609 (1978).
199. The Supreme Court is reluctant to find that the press has rights in addition to or varying
from those of the public generally. Blanchard, supra note 15.3, at 226. The Court has consolidated
first amendment rights under the speech and press clauses into a fundamental right to freedom of
expression. See note 173 supra. The press has rights under the free press clause coextensive only
with the public's rights under thefree speech clause, which amounts, essentially, to freedom from
restraint on pure expression absent a compelling state interest. If, however, the Court followed
the reasoning that the press is an agent of the public, the so-called "special" or "private" rights
that the press seeks under the free press clause would be identical to rights of the public under the
free press clause. The problem is not one of determining whether rights, such as a newsperson's
testimonial privilege, are public or private, but one of recognition by the Court that the free press
and free speech clauses are separate guarantees. Blanchard, supra note 158, at 227.
200. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
201. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
202. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966).
203. Landmark Communs., Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
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public interest being served. For example, exceptions to the general rule
governing search warrants204 and exemptions from administrative procedures
for access to sources of information 20 5 are viewed as protecting only newsper-
sons engaged in their occupation. 20 6 Public rights, on the other hand, are
those adhering to the press because of the benefits that accrue to the public. 207
Press activities that foster democracy by facilitating informed citizen partici-
pation are protected as public rights.
20 8
The distinction is crucial because the Court has held that newspersons are
not entitled to rights beyond those to which the public is entitled.2 0 9 If the
Court viewed the press as serving the public interest and analogized the
rights of the press to those of the public, 21 0 the Court's allegation that the
press is seeking special privileges, and its insistence on identical rights for
press and public under the speech and press clauses, 2 1 would be undercut.
212
As a result of the private right/public right dichotomy, the Court has
rejected the contention that the right to publish newsworthy information
inexorably requires protection of the right to acquire that newsworthy infor-
mation. 2 13 The Court has reasoned that access to information is limited
because of the existence of instances in which neither the press nor the public
is entitled to information. 214 For example, both are excluded from eaves-
204. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
205. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
206. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83 (1972). Justice Stewart has taken an opposite
view of the newsperson's privilege. Constitutional protection of this privilege exists not -for the
purely private interests of the newsman or his informant, nor even, at bottom, for the First
Amendment interests of either partner in the newsgathering relationship. Rather, it functions to
insure nothing less than democratic decisionmaking through the free flow of information to the
public .. " Id. at 737-38 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
207. See Landmark Communs., Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-39 (1978).
208. Id. at 839.
209. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-86 (1972). In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Court held that the news media could not be restricted from
disseminating information that is a matter of public record. Justice Powell stated that "[olur
decision in that case merely affirmed the right of the press to publish accurately information
contained in court records open to the public." Nixon v. Warner Communs., Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
609 (1978). In Nixon, the Court reversed a District of Columbia Circuit decision ordering release
of Nixon's tapes to the news media for dissemination of their contents to the public. Id. at 610.
The Court stated that the press was asking for access to actual tapes for broadcasting,
reproduction, and sale "to which the public ha[d] never had physical access." Id. at 609 (emphasis
in original).
210. Justice Powell articulated this view when he stated that constitutional protection of the
press does not arise from any special status of newspersons, but because the press is an" 'agent of
the public.' " Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2914 (1979) (concurring opinion).
211. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781-83 (1978); Nixon v. Warner Communs.,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978).
212. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (newsperson's privilege is a
fundamental personal right well founded in the first amendment); United States v. Steelhammer,
539 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1976) (court found privilege to be that of the public, with recognition
not afforded primarily to protect the reporter).
213. See Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883. 885 (3d Cir. 1958).
214. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2907-11 (1979) (no public right to
open trial in view of fact that other sixth amendment guarantees are personal to the accused);
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dropping on private conversations by means of wiretapping 21 5 and from
entering another's land without permission. 21 6 The rationale is flawed, how-
ever, because both these limitations arise from the presence of other rights,
not from government fiat. The Constitution protects against government
limitations on access to information. 21 7 The Court has also established a
hierarchy of interests contingent on the identities of the parties. When the
government, criminal defendant, and press are involved, government self-
interest is paramount, followed by the rights of the criminal defendant, and
then by those of the press, with no recognition that the Constitution affords
the latter two joint, rather than alternative protection. 218 The government's
interests have been given precedence over freedom of the press. 2 19 In
Branzburg v. Hayes, 2 2 0 the asserted government interest in the integrity of the
grand jury as an investigative arm of the criminal justice system 22 1 out-
weighed the first amendment rights of the press.
222
The Court's hierarchical approach has filtered down to lower courts. In
United States v. Pretzinger, 223 the Ninth Circuit balanced the press's interests
against those of the criminal justice system. 224 The court determined that the
trial judge, who had made a factual finding that the informant was a
government agent, 22 - did not err in refusing to require disclosure of the actual
Landmark Communs., Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-42 (1978) (information from
confidential hearings leaked to press may be disseminated without fear of criminal prosecution.
although no right of access exists to hearings themselves); Nixon v. Warner Communs., Inc., 435
U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (right to inspect and copy judicial records not absolute); see note 109 supra.
215. See Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 16 (1931); LaCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel.
Co., 114 Ohio App. 299, 182 N.E.2d 15 (1961).
216. See Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328 (1925); Brame v. Clark, 148 N.C.
364, 62 S.E. 418 (1908).
217. See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
218. For a general example of the Court's double standard, see note 29 supra. In Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct. 2627 (1979), the Court held that an arrest by a police officer made in "good-
faith reliance" on an ordinance subsequently declared unconstitutional was valid. Id. at 2631-34.
Therefore, evidence obtained in the search following the arrest should not be suppressed, Id. In
In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978), a newsperson asserted
good faith reliance on a shield law as granting a privilege of confidentiality. Id. at 265, 394 A.2d
at 333. The court held that the shield law conflicted with the sixth amendment right to
compulsory process of witnesses. Id. at 268, 394 A.2d at 350. Therefore, the newsperson was
required to disclose his source. See Zion, supra note 152 at 144.
219. Justice Douglas noted the inconsistency of the Court toward first amendment rights, at
times allowing a government interest to override absolute guarantees. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 716 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
220. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
221. Id. at 687-88.
222. Id. at 690-91; see Note, The Rights of Sources-The Critical Element in the Clash Over
Reporter's Privilege, 88 Yale L.J. 1202 (1979) (discussing the government's right to compel
newspersons' testimony) [hereinafter cited as The Rights of Sources].
223. 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976).
224. The defendant asserted that an undisclosed source provided the government with
advance knowledge of the drug exchange that resulted in his arrest. He contended that the
government should have obtained a warrant to search his truck and that the testimony of tile
undisclosed source would help establish this assertion. Id. at 519-20.
225. Id. at 521.
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identity of the press informant. 226 This decision against compelling disclosure
allowed the warrantless search to be upheld and maintained the anonymity of
a government agent. 227 Apparently, confidentiality was protected only be-
cause of the government interest involved. In Farr v. Pitchess,22 18 the Ninth
Circuit upheld the incarceration of a newsperson for contempt for refusing to
reveal the identity of a source who violated a gag order2 29 by disclosing
proposed trial testimony and evidence to the newsperson. 230 The court,
seeking to vindicate its authority by discovering who had breached the gag
order, held that the newsperson was required to reveal the source's identi-
ty.2 3 1 According to the court, the interest in the power of a court to enforce
restraints on publicity outweighed the newsperson's interest in protecting the
informant.232
B. The Sixth Amendment
The Court is frequently inconsistent in its view of a defendant's sixth
amendment rights. When the government seeks to compel testimony, the
Court assumes that the public right to every person's testimony is absolute.
For example, in Branzburg v. Hayes,233 the Court treated the general rule as
being one without exceptions, ignoring the existence of testimonial privi-
leges. 234 Conversely, when the defendant asserts the same right to compel
testimony under the sixth amendment, 23S the Court has held that the power is
not absolute, citing the existence of numerous privileges-husband-wife,
attorney-client, self-incrimination, and executive. 2 36 Furthermore, the Court
denies the privilege of confidentiality to the press despite the mandate of the
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
229. A gag order is a prior restraint on publication of information in criminal cases. Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541 (1976).
230. 522 F.2d at 466.
231. The Farr controversy arose from the highly publicized Charles Manson murder trial.
The trial judge imposed a gag order on the attorneys and witnesses to insure a fair trial by
controlling the release of prejudicial information to the public. Farr obtained information
violative of the gag order from two separate individuals. The trial judge invited Farr to disclose
the identities of the individuals who violated the order. Farr refused because he had promised
confidentiality. Several months later, after the conviction of Manson. the court instituted
proceedings to discover who had breached the court order. Farr was adjudged to be in contempt
and was incarcerated when he persisted in refusing to divulge the names. Farr v. Pitchess, 522
F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). Farr served 40 days under the
indefinite contempt sentence. The length of Farr's incarceration illustrates why the absence of
press insulation from government attempts at compelled disclosure of sources can severely inhibit
investigations by newspersons.
232. Id. at 469. In Farr, a privilege of confidentiality may not have been appropriate since
there was no apparent threat of unlawful reprisals against the informant. The privilege is
intended to protect press freedom, not to enable sources to elude legal sanctions for unlawful
activity. Thus, Farr should have disclosed the identity of the person who breached the gag order.
The result, therefore, was correct.
233. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
234. Id. at 682.
235. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-45 (1972).
236. Id.; see The Rights of Sources, supra note 222, at 1204 n. 16, cf. United States v. Bryan,
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first amendment, while simultaneously maintaining that the sixth amendment
right only serves to make the testimonial duty a practical reality rather than
an absolute, fundamental right. 237 Thus, the Court uses the existence of
testimonial privileges as a double-edged sword that inevitably favors govern-
ment interests. 238
When the press's first amendment rights are involved, the Court places
more emphasis on the defendant's sixth amendment guarantees. 239 The
criminal defendant's rights have diminished in magnitude when the govern-
ment asserts the supposed protection of the public interest in the free flow of
information 240 or in the fair administration of justice through enforcement of
a nondisclosure policy against an individual's right to prepare his defense. 24'
Because the Court has declined to recognize a right to know when someone
other than the government is claiming the right on behalf of the public, 242 the
assertion results in a further anomaly. The interest in the free flow of
information seemingly magnifies in importance when it is asserted by the
government.
The Supreme Court's opposition to finding a first amendment privilege of
confidentiality between a newsperson and an informant 243 has resulted in
lower courts repeatedly holding that such a privilege is totally inimical to the
criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights. 2' 4 It is rare, however, that a
newsperson conducts a full scale investigation into a single criminal act by an
obscure individual, thereby gaining information essential to his defense. 245 It
339 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1950) (Court held that exemptions are exceptional situations to otherwise
pervasive general rule).
237. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
23 & n.21 (1967).
238. See Zion, supra note 152, at 76.
239. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The Court in Estes held that a defendant's right
to a fair trial overrides first amendment protection of newsgathering, Therefore, the news media
is not entitled to unlimited access to the courtroom to televise a trial. The Court noted, however,
that the public's right to be informed was not infringed because reporters could still be present In
the courtroom and were free to report what occurred in court. Id. at 541-42.
240. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
241. Id. at 62.
242. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2904-05, 2911-12 (1979); Nixon v.
Warner Communs., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1978).
243. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 702-06 (1972) (ramifications of testimonial
privilege on right to compulsory process at criminal trials).
244. United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 213-15 (D.D.C. 1972); In re Farber, 78 N.J.
259, 268, 394 A.2d 330, 334, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); People v. LeGrand, 67 A.D.2d
446, 453, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252, 256-57 (2d Dep't 1979); People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d 850, 854,
370 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
245. Recognition of a newsperson's privilege will rarely and insubstantially disadvantage law
enforcement or the criminal defendant. First, reporters seldom have information centrally related
to specific crimes that would constitute relevant and admissible evidence. Reporters are usually
not the sole possessors of such information. Hearings, supra note 24, at 227 (statement of John
O'Hara); Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 229, 276 (1971).
Second, between one third and one half of -eporters may actually testify despite the existence of
an absolute privilege. Hearings, supra note 24, at 227 (statement of John O'Hara); Blasi, supra, at
256. Third, even when no privilege exists, up to one half of reporters subpoenaed accept
contempt citations and incarceration rather than breach a promise of confidentiality. Hearings,
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is also doubtful that crucial evidence would be forthcoming from a
confidential source in these circumstances. 246 Generally, confidential sources
discuss criminal activity on a larger scale than that with which the usual
criminal defendant is involved. 247 Therefore, it seems unreasonable to deny
the privilege on the basis that it would result in widespread unfairness in the
trial of criminal defendants.
The Court's view that the interests protected by the first and sixth amend-
ments are competing is generally inaccurate. The first and sixth amendments
were intended to, and should, function in tandem, although occasionally there
will be some incompatibility. When this occurs, and it is determined that the
sixth amendment interests take precedence over the first amendment interests
at issue, the government must act to protect the defendant's sixth amendment
rights.
V. SAFEGUARDING SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS BY DISCONTINUANCE OF
THE PROSECUTION
When the defendant has met the threshold criteria of demonstrating his
entitlement to disclosure of the newsperson's source,2 48 and when he has
satisfied the court that he will be denied a fair trial unless he obtains process
of the informant, the newsperson should be required to identify his source. A
problem with safeguarding the defendant's recognizably jeopardized sixth
amendment right may arise if the defendant cannot obtain the witness
because the newsperson asserts his privilege and resists disclosure.
In first versus sixth amendment cases, the Supreme Court has asserted that
a privilege of confidentiality hinders the goal of fairness in the judicial
system.2 49 When this interest in fairness to the defendant equals the first
amendment considerations, 25 0 the Court should proceed so as to achieve
fairness. If the basis for denying the privilege is the alleged conflict between
the privilege and the sixth amendment that precludes the defendant from
receiving a fair trial, it is inconsistent for a court to allow the prosecution to
continue despite the witness' absence. 25 1 The Supreme Court's position on the
respective rights and abilities of the government and the defendant to compel
testimony25 2 may be responsible for its failure to insist on the discontinuance
of prosecution when a witness cannot be obtained.
The prosecutor and the court must not deny a defendant his constitutional
right and, after the court has unsuccessfully exercised its coercive powers
against a newsperson, then decline to forego the prosecution. In Webb v.
Texas,253 a trial judge intimidated the defendant's only defense witness,
supra note 24, at 227 (statement of John O'Hara); Blasi, supra, at 276-77. See also Guest &
Stanzler, supra note 11, at 51.
246. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 557; note 245 supra.
247. See notes 75-82 supra and accompanying text.
248. For a discussion of these criteria, see pt. III supra.
249. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-702 (1972).
250. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551-56 (1976); id. at 612 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
251. See Westen, supra note 16, at 174; Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 51 n.159.
252. See pL IV(B) supra.
253. 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
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effectively depriving him of his right to present a defense. The Supreme Court
held that the defendant's right to a fair trial was sufficiently prejudiced to
warrant reversal of the conviction.2 - 4 The decision reflects the Court's fre-
quently articulated policy that the public interest is in the fair administration
of justice, 2 s and not merely in the conviction of indicted defendants. The
Court in Webb found that the absence of the witness prevented an accurate
assessment of the defendant's guilt or innocence.256 Therefore, the public had
no interest in an improperly obtained conviction. 257 If the Court were to
employ this reasoning, a similar result would be reached in instances in which
the courts' coercive measures against the newsperson fail to obtain the witness
for the defense.
The situation is closely analogous to cases in which the government has
used confidential informants and chooses to maintain anonymity at the cost of
dismissal of a prosecution. 258 In such cases, the government may have
convincing evidence of a defendant's guilt, if police informants are as effective
as the Supreme Court asserts. 259 The Court has held that a defendant is
entitled to disclosure of a government informant's identity when the defendant
demonstrates that disclosure is "relevant and helpful" to his defense. 260 If the
government nevertheless withholds the information, the prosecution must be
stopped. 26' The government uses a policy of nonprosecution every day "in
many cases where evidence essential to the defense would require disclo-
sure." 262 The practice is justified by law enforcement officials' need to
preserve the viability of the informant in future investigations requiring police
infiltration.2 63 Presumably, the benefit of maintaining anonymity in the
long-range picture of criminal apprehension outweighs the number and scope
of prosecutions that are foregone. The instances in which a criminal defen-
dant demonstrates entitlement to compelled disclosure of the press informant's
identity, combined with the newsperson's refusal to comply, will be similarly
infrequent. 264 Therefore, the public's interest in safety and effective curtail-
ment of criminal activity will not be significantly hampered. Moreover, a
policy of nonprosecution when a newsperson chooses to maintain anonymity
would not be an unprecedented procedure 265 uniquely contrary to the public
254. Id. at 98.
255. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728
(1961); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
271 (1941).
256. 409 U.S. at 98.
257. Id.
258. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
259. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697-98 (1972).
260. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
261. See id. at 61.
262. Id. at 67 (Clark, J., dissenting).
263. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697-98 (1972).
264. Furthermore, confidential press-informant relationships foster detection of illegal activ-
ity. See notes 79-85 .supra and accompanying text.
265. In 1977, a grand jury investigated the possibility of bringing an indictment of perjury
and obstruction of justice against former CIA director Richard Helms. The Justice Department
considered foregoing prosecution of the felony because material concerning the CIA and its covert
Chilean operations would have to have been introduced at trial. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977, at
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interest. The prospect of criminals being turned loose to preserve constitu-
tional rights may not appear to be in furtherance of societal interests. It is
important to remember, however, that an indicted defendant is not necessar-
ily guilty. Therefore, nonprosecution will not always involve freeing crimi-
nals. In addition, if our judicial system is to be fair, its primary goal must be
truth ascertainment. When truth ascertainment is frustrated, society's interest
in continuing prosecution disappears. 266
The defendant's interest in obtaining information from the press is equally
important to his interest in obtaining information from a government infor-
mant. 267 The government, in both instances, is trying the defendant and, if
that trial is unfair, is denying the defendant his constitutional rights. The
identity of the party possessing the information sought, whether it is the press
or the government, should not be the relevant factor. The important issue lies
in the impermissibility of government abridgment of constitutional rights
under the sixth amendment. The discrepancy in treatment of a defendant on
the basis of the identity of the possessor of the source's name is arbitrary and
unfair.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's treatment of a newsperson's privilege is inadequate.
Neither state shield laws nor ad hoc determinations of whether a privilege
adheres under a particular set of facts remove the dangers of government
harassment of the press, of a substantial chill of the free flow of information to"
the public, or of government secrecy on matters of importance to popular
15, col. 1. Although Helms was indicted, the Justice Department negotiated an agreement
whereby Helms pleaded nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge and received a suspended
sentence. The Justice Department balanced its perception of national security against law
enforcement interests and allowed a "big-shot crook" to go virtually free. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6,
1977, § 4, at 1, col. 1. More recently, the Justice Department dropped perjury charges against
former ITT executive Robert Berrellez to avoid disclosing information about United States
intelligence activities in Latin America. The government allegedly dropped the prosecution in the
interest of national security. It had been suggested, however, that the information was more
embarrassing to the government than vital to security, particularly because the national security
interests asserted were never elaborated. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1979, § A, at 1. col 3.
The government has occasionally "lost" evidence to keep the accused from discovering it.
United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see Westen, supra note 16, at
174-75. Courts have held that when evidence discoverable by a defendant in a criminal
proceeding becomes unavailable to the accused because of its "loss," whether through intentional
nonpreservation, destruction, or negligent or good faith loss by the government, a new trial,
dismissal of the indictment, or exclusion of testimony may be appropriate. See United States v.
Perry, 471 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (good faith of government in nonproduction of
evidence not determinative of government's liability and admissibility of testimony against
defendant); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 650, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (government "loss"
of evidence may result in dismissal of indictment); Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 470, 472
(Dist. CL App. 1971), writ discharged, 280 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1973) (prosecution witness barred
from testifying because prosecutor failed to produce lost bullet).
266. Wright, Fair Trial-Free Press, 38 F.R.D. 435 (1965).
267. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-20 (1967) (accused's right to compel testimony of
defense witnesses is equivalent to the right to present a defense).
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policy formation and democratic decisionmaking. Although the Court main-
tains that it is protecting sixth amendment rights through nonrecognition of a
first amendment press privilege, continuance of a prosecution despite the
unavailability of a crucial witness is inconsistent with this assertion. Uphold-
ing the fundamental rights of both the press and the defendant requires
recognition of a broad privilege of confidentiality and dismissal of a prosecu-
tion when presentation of a meaningful defense is impossible without disclo-
sure of an informant's identity.
Annett Swierzbinski
